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Testing the international Trilemma traditionally relies on discretely classified
exchange rate regimes. This simplification limits the implications drawn for middle-
ground policies like managed floats or basket pegs, and inhibits inference on the
empirical shape of the exchange rate stability – monetary autonomy trade-off. To
address these issues, this paper proposes a continuous measure of exchange rate
flexibility for estimating monetary policy spillovers along the entire spectrum of
peg intensities. Monetary spillovers generally increase with exchange rate stabil-
ity, even within middle ground policies, and basket pegs diversify such spillovers.
I then estimate the empirical shape of the trade-off using machine learning tech-
niques, finding that the relationship between monetary autonomy and exchange
rate stability is significantly non-linear in both advanced economies and emerging
markets. Specifically, partially targeting the exchange rate translates to dispropor-
tionately smaller or larger monetary spillovers along middle-ground exchange rate
regimes. For emerging markets in particular, active reserves management is a key
mechanism associated with these non-linearities.
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1 Introduction
The international policy Trilemma Mundell [1963] states that no country can meet all
three objectives: Independent monetary policy, free capital flows, and exchange rate
stability. The importance of these implications has grown sharply amid the onset of
rapid financial globalization, remaining an enduring topic of discussion among academics
and policymakers alike. However, research on the policy Trilemma almost exclusively
focuses on the effects of corner policy choices (e.g., exchange rates are either considered
fixed or floating, capital accounts are either open or closed) because of the challenges
associated with constructing continuous measures of Trilemma policy variables. Despite
the substantial presence of intermediate exchange rate regimes around the world, we
know relatively little of the implications of middle-ground policy choices on monetary
autonomy. This study aims to address this gap in the literature.
A growing body of evidence suggests that the Trilemma generally holds in the short
and long-run: conditional on open capital flows, international transmission of monetary
policy from base countries tend to be stronger under fixed exchange rates than under
floating (Frankel et al. [2004], Shambaugh [2004], Obstfeld et al. [2005], Miniane and
Rogers [2007], Klein and Shambaugh [2015], Herwartz and Roestel [2017], Eichengreen
[2018], Han and Wei [2018]).1 Typical estimates of monetary pass-through suggest that
transmission is incomplete (i.e. less than 1-for-1), and less complete in emerging markets,
with the unanticipated component of base country monetary policy changes exhibiting
greater pass-through rates (Bluedorn and Bowdler [2010]).
While the literature on international monetary spillovers under the policy Trilemma
is highly active and growing, most empirical studies resort to categorizing exchange rate
regimes in a binary fashion (fixed or floating) due to various challenges, including data
limitations and the practical difficulties associated with classifying exchange rate regimes.
Frankel et al. [2004] and Klein and Shambaugh [2015] break this trend by studying
monetary autonomy while considering intermediate exchange rate regimes as a class of
their own. Both studies find that intermediate regimes buy some monetary autonomy
relative to fixed exchange rates. While offering several important contributions, these
studies are limited in terms of allowing for heterogeneity within intermediate exchange
rate regimes.2 Given the wide spectrum of intermediate peg intensities, this may be
an overly restrictive classification. Specifically, whether monetary policy spillovers are
1In contrast, a number of studies debate that the Trilemma has broken down to a ‘Dilemma’, rendering
exchange rate policy irrelevant for monetary independence due to several reasons related to financial
globalization (Calvo and Reinhart [2002], Frankel et al. [2004], Rey [2015], Miranda-Agrippino and Rey
[2020], Georgiadis and Zhu [2019]). However, Klein and Shambaugh [2015] and Han and Wei [2018]
specifically consider these factors and still find that monetary policy pass-through to foreign interest
rates is significantly stronger (weaker) under fixed (floating) exchange rate regimes.
2Though importantly, Frankel et al. [2004] do differentiate between bands and managed floats, two
regimes falling under the intermediate classification.
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linearly, or non-linearly related to exchange rate policy remains an open question requiring
greater detail on peg flexibility within the class of intermediate exchange rate regimes.
In this paper, I depart from the literature by introducing an exchange rate regime
measure which is fully continuous. My particular approach brings with it three distinct
advantages. First, it relaxes the constraint that all intermediate exchange rate regimes
are identical. Second, It allows one to investigate the open question of whether monetary
policy transmission under the Trilemma is linear in exchange rate flexibility, as typically
assumed. If it is not, what are the policy implications? What mechanisms may be
generating an empirical non-linearity? These are important issues that I attempt to
address. Third, this approach allows for testing monetary spillovers under basket pegs,
which itself remains unexplored in the empirical Trilemma literature.
Continuous exchange rate regime measures themselves are not new. A separate yet
related line of research aims to study the Trilemma configuration using continuous policy
measures. Aizenman et al. [2010], Aizenman et al. [2013], and Ito and Kawai [2014]
investigate the Trilemma middle-ground under a continuous policy setting, but rather
than focusing on monetary policy spillovers, they focus on macroeconomic outcomes
and determinants of such middle-ground policy configurations (Aizenman and Ito [2014],
Jordà et al. [2015], Frankel et al. [2019] and Obstfeld et al. [2019]).
Studies combining the two approaches – testing monetary policy spillovers under con-
tinuous measures of exchange rate flexibility – are few and far apart. One closely related
paper, Herwartz and Roestel [2017], studies monetary pass-through in such a fashion
among a sample of advanced economies, documenting a nearly linear trade-off between
exchange rate stability and monetary autonomy. I build on this issue, differing from the
previous study in several ways. First, I consider a larger panel of countries across both
advanced economies and emerging markets. Second, I introduce a different continuous,
de facto measure of exchange rate regime by drawing on the literature related to esti-
mating currency zones.3 I estimate non-overlapping, quarterly de facto peg intensities
vis-a-vis three candidate base currencies using daily exchange rate returns. The method
is flexible enough to allow for multiple exchange rate targets, allowing for spillover tests
under basket peg policies. By contrast, Herwartz and Roestel [2017] rely on the exchange
stability index proposed in Aizenman et al. [2008], which is a transformation of the annual
standard deviation of monthly exchange rate changes. By using higher-frequency, daily
exchange rate data my approach provides more consistent estimates of quarterly de facto
exchange rate variability. I then go a step further in attempting to identify the underlying
mechanisms which may lead to a non-linear relationship between exchange rate flexibility
and monetary autonomy, namely exchange market intervention via international reserves,
and international limits to arbitrage.
The main contributions of this paper are three-fold. First, under a new continuous
3Haldane and Hall [1991] and Frankel and Wei [1992].
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exchange rate regime measure, I confirm prevailing evidence of existing monetary policy
spillovers within the context of the international Trilemma. Second, I document new
evidence suggesting that monetary policy spillovers can be diversified under basket pegs.
Third, I test the linearity of the Trilemma through leveraging both standard econometric
methods and more recent machine learning models such as Generalized Additive Models
(GAMs). In both sets of tests, I identify the effects of foreign monetary policy shocks
on domestic monetary policy using the instrumental variables (IV) approach of Jordà
et al. [2015] and Jordà et al. [2020]. Both the standard econometric and GAM speci-
fications point to a significant non-linear relationship between exchange rate flexibility
and monetary independence along intermediate exchange rate regimes: greater exchange
rate stabilization translates to disproportionately smaller or larger losses in monetary
autonomy along certain parts of the peg intensity spectrum. This contrasts Herwartz
and Roestel [2017], who find a near linear relationship between exchange rate stability
and monetary autonomy. Moreover, net ‘gains’ in monetary autonomy are allocated dif-
ferently across advanced economies and emerging markets. Advanced economies tend to
put greater emphasis on output stabilization while emerging markets focus on inflation.
Among emerging markets, active reserves management appears to be a plausible mech-
anism generating these empirical non-linearities. These findings are robust to a variety
of sensitivity tests, including: testing for short-run and long-run monetary spillovers; ac-
counting for the zero lower bound; alternative exchange rate regime classifications; using
exogenous U.S. monetary policy shocks around FOMC events; omitting the 2008 Global
Financial Crisis period; changes in the SDR basket components.
These results also bear implications for the Two-Corners Hypothesis which gained
popularity after the late 90’s early 2000’s chain of financial crises experienced across the
world. The argument is that middle ground exchange rate regimes are unstable and crisis
prone, therefore exchange rate policy should converge to either fixed or floating (Frankel
et al. [2000]). However, empirically this hypothesis has been continuously rejected, as
middle-ground exchange rate policies are alive and well (Fischer [2001], Masson [2001],
Williamson [2002], Frankel [2019], Frankel et al. [2019]). Most of the world follows an
intermediate exchange rate regime. As of 2018, 46.6% of the 189 IMF member countries
report administering intermediate pegs - up from 40% in 2010.4 In addition, extensive
empirical evidence suggests that many of the world’s floating exchange rates are actu-
ally managed floats - i.e., intermediate pegs of varying flexibility. Calvo and Reinhart
[2002] and Ilzetzki et al. [2019] both highlight the systematic ‘Fear of Floating’ exhibited
by exchange rates of countries which presumably claim to float, despite pervasive con-
tradicting evidence. My findings support this view such that across countries and over
time, a substantial proportion of countries in the sample appear to partially target the




The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly goes over the data.
Section 3 discusses measurement and estimation of continuous de facto exchange rate
regimes. Section 4 goes on to discuss notable trends and statistics in de facto exchange
rate regimes across countries over the last two decades. Section 5 covers the baseline
empirical strategy for analyzing monetary policy transmission under the policy Trilemma.
Section 6 then goes over baseline results. Section 7 pays particular focus on testing for
potential non-linear monetary policy spillovers under intermediate exchange rate regimes
and Section 8 then explores potential underlying mechanisms which may generate these
non-linearities. Section 9 covers a battery of robustness checks and Section 10 concludes.
2 Data
I consider a panel composed of 46 countries which does not include the U.S. and E.U. over
the period Q1 2000 to Q4 2018 (quarterly frequency).5 12 are Advanced Economies and 34
are Emerging Markets. The list of countries are reported in Table A.1 in the Appendix.6
The data was collected from multiple sources. Quarterly central bank policy interest
rates are taken from the BIS and IMF IFS databases. Additional data on interest rates
were collected from individual central bank websites and Global Financial Data. When
official central bank policy rates could not be used, short-term treasury bills, repos, or
discount rates are used. The use of short-term rates ensures that proper testing of the
Trilemma, based on UIP, can be conducted such that maturities broadly match across
countries.
Inflation and CPI data is primarily drawn from the BIS, IMF IFS, and the World
Bank. For country-quarter observations where data was not available, annual inflation
rates (divided by four) were used for imputation. Inflation is year-over-year. Nominal
GDP data is from the IMF IFS database. Growth rates are computed as year-over-
year. Missing observations were imputed using annual frequency growth rates from the
World Bank. Daily exchange rate data is taken from the BIS and are used to estimate
de-facto exchange rate peg intensity. Moreover, daily log returns are aggregated to the
quarterly frequency, and combined with inflation data to recover quarterly real exchange
rate returns. A positive change in the real exchange rate corresponds to local depreciation.
Daily commodity price data for gold, copper, crude oil, coffee and sugar are taken from
Bloomberg. Specifically, I rely on front month futures contract prices. Data on daily and
quarterly CBOE VIX index values, a common gauge for global risk appetite, are from
5The country choice is subject to data coverage. The data is taken from all publicly available sources.
After cleaning and merging data from various sources, 46 countries in total have sufficient sized samples
to conduct the analysis.
6Select Tables and Figures are moved to the Appendix for brevity. Table an figure numbers labeled
with ‘A’ refer to those in the Appendix.
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FRED.
Annual capital controls measures are taken from the Chinn-Ito index (Chinn and Ito
[2006]) derived from the IMF AREAER, and repeated over each quarter within the year.
For Serbia, capital control measurements are taken from the Wang-Jahan index, which
is also derived from the IMF AREAR index. Remaining missing values for Serbia are
extrapolated (2000-2004, and 2014-2018). Since the index is updated through 2017, I
extrapolate 2017 values to 2018. Developed and Emerging/Developing Economy classifi-
cations are taken from IMF WEO (2019). Data on foreign exchange reserves are taken
from the IMF International Reserves and Foreign Currency Liquidity database. Interna-
tional reserves are measured as the sum of total foreign currency reserves, IMF reserve
positions and SDRs. Gold holdings are excluded from calculation.
For robustness, additional tests are run using alternative definitions of exchange rate
regime. Specifically, I use the Ilzetzki et al. [2019] data set on de-facto exchange rate
regimes and anchor currencies, which has 14 classes of flexibility which I consolidate into
a smaller set. IRR exchange rate regime only thorough Q 4 2016. I take quarterly averages
of monthly exchange rate regimes. Fed Fund Futures data are taken from Bloomberg.
First contract month yield changes are computed over the day of a scheduled FOMC
meeting. Daily monetary policy shocks are then aggregated to the quarterly level (simple
sum).
In the process of cleaning the data, I remove country-quarter observations which are
deemed outliers based on: Interest rate changes greater than 5 percentage points in
absolute value, interest rate levels greater than 50%, and inflation greater than 40%.7
3 De-Facto Peg Intensities
A key limitation across studies on the policy Trilemma is the coarse classification of ex-
change rate regimes. Most studies resort to a binary (or at best, discrete) splitting of
observations into either ‘floating’ or ‘fixed’ exchange rate regimes. While this is an im-
portant consideration when focusing on the corner configurations of the policy Trilemma,
little can be said about the monetary autonomy trade-off under more complex exchange
rate targeting policies, such as an intermediate peg or basket peg. Moreover, intermedi-
ate exchange rate regimes are not all equal: policymakers choose the degree of flexibility
which potentially gives way to a spectrum of exchange rate regimes (peg intensities) which
vary both across countries and over time.
As a parsimonious solution for estimating a continuous measure of the de-facto ex-
change rate regime, I follow and extend the methodology introduced in Haldane and
Hall [1991], Frankel and Wei [1992], and later on in Benassy-Quere et al. [2006]. This
7Comparable to Ilzetzki et al. [2019].
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regression-based technique estimates continuous ‘peg intensities’ that are directly asso-
ciated with a base currency.8 The first-step here is to estimate non-overlapping de-facto
peg intensities at the quarterly frequency. These estimates, which characterize country’s
exchange rate regime, can then be applied in the main analysis testing for monetary
policy transmission. I extend the methodology along two dimensions. First, I rely on
higher frequency (daily) data to estimate non-overlapping, lower frequency (quarterly)
peg intensities. This contrasts the traditional approach of estimating peg intensities on
an overlapping or rolling basis. Second, I control for global common factors and shocks
which may impact exchange rate fluctuations both in the country of interest and the base
country – specifically world commodity prices and global investor risk aversion.
Like Haldane and Hall [1991] I use daily exchange rate data which yields a sufficient
number of observations for consistent quarterly peg intensity estimates. However at the
daily frequency the issue of asynchronous trading hours across international exchange
rate markets might pollute the regression analysis. One solution would be to use weekly
exchange rates (Frankel and Wei [1992] and McCauley and Chan [2014]), but the number
of observations to estimate quarterly peg intensities would drastically drop. To overcome
the issue of potential non-overlapping trading hours while preserving the number of ob-
servations, I compute 2-day rolling average exchange rate returns following Forbes and
Rigobon [2002] and Wang et al. [2017]. Then over each quarter, I estimate the following
regression with daily data:















where ∆eid(t) is the day d (of month t) change in the log exchange rate of country i
vis-a-vis the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights currency basket (SDR) and base currencies
on the RHS denoted ∆ebd, b ∈ {e,U, $}, are the Euro, Japanese Yen, and U.S. Dollar
vis-a-vis the SDR, respectively. I choose these three currencies as the possible set of
base currencies because of their disproportionately large role in international trade and
finance. The U.S. Dollar and the Euro together make up the large majority of: base
currency pegs, international reserves holdings, external debt currency denomination, and
trade invoicing currency globally.9 Furthermore, following the literature, the specification
implicitly assumes that these three base currencies are de facto pure floaters, making up
the potential candidate target currencies for all other countries.
Note that the question of which numeraire to use is discussed extensively in the
literature as it affects the interpretation of the error term when the currency does not
8Variants of this methodology have been recently implemented in McCauley and Chan [2014], Ito and
Kawai [2016] and Ito and McCauley [2019] to study cross-country patterns in trade invoicing currencies,
global imbalances and the composition of central bank foreign reserves. Frankel et al. [2019] consider
continuous de facto exchange rate regimes to study their effects on economic growth.
9See Gopinath [2015], Maggiori et al. [2019], Goldberg and Lerman [2019] and the recent ECB note
(ECB [2019]).
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follow a perfect hard peg.10 To circumvent this issue, I follow Frankel [1993] and Ma
and McCauley [2011] by considering SDRs as the numeraire. Meanwhile, other solutions
have been proposed: Frankel et al. [2001] use a basket of currencies – not unlike the SDR
– and Frankel [1993] use consumer price indices as the numeraire.11 Another proposed
solution which does not consider a basket-type numeraire but still attempts to deal with
the collinearity of exchange rates induced by triangular arbitrage is to simply use the USD
as a numeraire, but have the regressions explicitly omit the USD exchange rate from the
RHS. For example, Ito and McCauley [2016] and Ito and McCauley [2019] denominate
exchange rate returns in USD, but on the right hand side include base country currencies
but not the USD. Then, to estimate the weight on the USD, the authors take the difference
between 1 and the sum of the estimated weights on the other base currencies. The
advantage of this approach is that it simplifies the problem of choosing an appropriate
numeraire. Meanwhile, a potential drawback is that the weight on the USD base is
restricted such that the weights across all base currencies necessarily sum to 1. Ma and
McCauley [2011] further demonstrate that the results from Frankel and Wei [1993] are
robust to using either the SDR or the U.S. Dollar as the numeraire.
Equation 1 implies that the movements of each currency i are decomposed to a
weighted average of the base currencies plus an idiosyncratic error term. These weights
translate to peg intensities against base currencies. For example, with a currency that
pegs perfectly to the U.S. Dollar (e.g. Ecuador, which has been Dollarized since 2000),
W $it would equal 1 and the other weights would equal zero. In contrast, a purely floating
exchange rate would have weights statistically indifferent from zero across all three base
currencies, and an exchange rate which targets a basket (e.g. Singapore) would have
non-zero weights on multiple base currencies. Therefore, the strength of the peg is given
by a value between 0 and 1, where 0 is no weight (float), and a 1 is interpreted as a hard
peg to the base currency. This way we arrive at a continuous measure of peg intensity
for each country, for each quarter, through exploiting currency movements at the daily
frequency.
An important note to emphasize is that a peg intensity estimate equal to 1 does not
necessarily imply pegging, especially if the estimated regression results in a poor model
fit, which would most likely coincide with statistical insignificance. To correct for such
scenarios, I follow the algorithm of Ito and McCauley [2019] to clean peg intensity esti-
mates.12. Additionally Figure A.1 and Table 1 report the distributional characteristics of
10Additionally, if the numeraire moves closely in line with one of the candidate base currencies, then
that base currency will have very small variance and may be confused with the constant term (Benassy-
Quere et al. [2006]).
11I do not consider using price indices as the numeraire because price index data is not available at the
daily frequency. One could alternatively consider trade-weighted effective exchange rates as a solution
to the numeraire problem (though results are likely to remain similar as the SDR and trade-weighted
exchange rate returns are highly correlated).
12To clean and remove spurious results when estimating Equation 1: before estimating Equation 1,
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R2 across all country-quarter observations where a strong peg is estimated (i.e. there is
a Ŵ bit = 1).
Table 1: Summary statistics of R2 from all country-quarter re-
gressions where Ŵ b
it
= 1
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(50) Pctl(75) Max
R2 1,634 0.740 0.309 0.04 0.48 0.92 1 1
Immediately notice the very high median R2 of 0.92 and that the majority of values lie
between 0.48 and 1, validating that most of the identified country-quarters under strong
pegs in fact bear appropriately high model fits, thereby further confirming the reliability
of the first-stage results.
3.1 Controlling for common shocks
A potential issue with the standard estimation of Equation 1 is that it doesn’t recognize
the role of global factors or common shocks which may influence jointly country i’s and
base country b’s exchange rate, thus generating what may appear as large or sudden shifts
in exchange rate policy if not controlled for. For example, common factors may include
fluctuations in global commodity prices. Through driving variation in the terms-of-trade,
commodities are known to influence exchange rates of resource-dependent economies.
Exchange rates exhibiting such behavior are often dubbed ‘commodity currencies’ (Chen
and Rogoff [2003], Ahmed [2020], Beckmann et al. [2020], among several others).
In addition to commodities, global investor risk appetite appears to play an increas-
ingly potent role in driving broad currency risk (Avdjiev et al. [2019]). Periods of high
risk aversion tend to coincide with episodes of Dollar and Yen appreciation as they are
viewed as global safe assets. At the same time, risk aversion drives risky asset prices
lower, which may include Emerging Market or carry trade currencies. Thereby, risk aver-
sion shocks can induce correlations in foreign exchange markets which are not necessarily
be driven by the exchange rate targeting mechanism.
I first omit observations of daily log exchange rate changes exceeding 5% in absolute value to prevent
crisis-related outliers from influencing peg intensity estimates (as similarly done in Ilzetzki et al. [2019]
who remove inflation observations exceeding 40% in their analysis). Then, after estimating Equation 1,
any statistically significant negative coefficient estimates of the peg intensities (W b
it
) is set to be a missing
value (large negative weights are theoretically inconsistent). Statistically insignificant negative values are
set to zero (because a weight of zero is not rejected in this case). Values statistically significantly greater
than one are taken to be missing values (positive values exceeding one are theoretically inconsistent),
and values insignificantly greater than 1 are set to 1 (becuase a weight of 1 cannot be rejected in this
case).
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I control for these common drivers by augmenting Equation 1 with global factors:















Btk∆ckd(t) + Ct∆vixd(t) + ǫ
i
d(t). (2)
In Equation 2, ∆ckd(t) refers to daily log returns from commodity k over quarter
t, and ∆vixd(t) refers to daily log changes in the VIX index - a proxy for global risk
appetite.13 For commodities, I consider K = 5 heavily traded world commodities: Gold,
copper, crude oil, coffee and sugar. The two estimation procedures result in two sets of de
facto peg intensities: the conventional measures Ŵ bit and the estimates upon controlling
for global factors W̃ bit which I’ll refer to as the augmented measures. For robustness, I’ll
typically consider both when testing for monetary spillovers.
4 Trends in Exchange Rate Policy
I estimate peg intensities for a sample of 52 currencies against the U.S. Dollar, Euro,
and Japanese Yen (Table A.2 and continued on Table A.3).14 Because of the broadly
low peg levels against the Yen, I focus on the cross-country dynamics of USD and EUR
peg intensities. Figure 1 shows percentages of countries falling into each exchange rate
classification over the 2000-2018 period. Floats, intermediates and pegs are defined as
peg intensity estimates Ŵ bit ∈ {[0, .1], (.1, .9], (.9, 1]}, respectively. 4-quarter averages are
plotted for clarity. A striking consistency is how persistent the proportion of intermediate
exchange rate regimes have been over the past two decades across both base currencies,
particularly the USD. Roughly a third of the sample follows an intermediate peg at any
given period. Moreover, the proportion of countries floating against the USD nearly dou-
bled from 20% in 2000 to 40% by 2018. This trend was driven by countries transitioning
away from a hard USD peg, rather than intermediate pegs becoming more flexible.
A striking statistic in the data is the number and proportion of actual pure floats across
the sample (Figure 2). In 2000, the only currency which had estimated peg intensities
of less than or equal to 0.20 against all three base currencies was the British Pound.
Including the three base currencies, that amounts to just four pure floats at the turn of
the century. Proportionately, it is clear from the figure that pure floating currencies are
historically scarce and continue to be so. In 2018, the number rose to ten if we include
the base currencies USD, EUR and JPY under the assumption that they are floats.
13The CBOE VIX index is a model-free measure of 30-day expected volatility of the S&P 500 stock
index derived from options prices.
14Exchange rate data is available for 52 countries, but due to varying data coverage, after merging all
data sets together the main analysis is conducted on a panel of 46 countries as discussed in Section 2.
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Figure 1: Exchange Rate Regimes Across Countries, vis-a-vis
USD (left), EUR (right)
Floats, intermediates and pegs are defined as peg intensity es-
timates Ŵ b
it
∈ {[0, .1], (.1, .9], (.9, 1]}, respectively. Rolling 4-
quarter averages.
Additional identified countries are Brunei and Singapore, the Chinese Yuan, Korean
Won, Thai Baht, Canadian Dollar and British Pound. The Emerging Market cases are of
particular interest. The currency of Brunei is officially pegged to Singapore’s, therefore
its flexibility vis-a-vis the USD, EUR, or JPY rises as Singapore’s flexibility rises despite
not being a true floating currency. Throughout 2018, the Thai Baht / Singapore Dollar
exchange rate was exceptionally stable, suggesting that Thailand was likely de facto
targeting vis-a-vis the SGD. Singapore itself has realized steady gains in exchange rate
flexibility over the past two decades. The Chinese Yuan saw its peg intensity to the
USD weaken dramatically since 2016 amidst rising trade tensions between China and the
United States. South Korea has been under an inflation targeting monetary regime since
the early 2000’s. If Brunei and Thailand are dropped from the list of true floats due to
their de facto targeting of the SGD, and the case of China is considered transient, that
leaves just 7 currencies under a truly pure float in 2018, with Singapore and South Korea
being potentially new and notable independent floaters.
Figure 3 sorts peg intensities from lowest to highest across countries, for the year
2000 and 2018.15 The number of hard U.S. pegs (intensity greater than 0.90) have fallen
drastically over the past two decades, while the number of floaters rose. In contrast,
peg intensities against the EUR have risen over the past 20 years.16 Moreover, the
15The plotted intensities are 4-quarter averages.
16Ito and McCauley [2019] attribute this partly to commodity currencies moving away from the pure
U.S. Dollar zone to a more intermediate position between the Dollar and Euro.
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Figure 2: Sample Proportion of ‘Pure’ Floaters, 2000-2018
I define a currency as a pure floater in any particular quarter if all three
weights, Ŵ b
it
where, b ∈ {USD, EUR, JPY}, are estimated to be less than
0.20. Rolling 4-quarter average of Ŵ b
it
is used. Total sample contains 55
countries; number is inclusive of USD, EUR, and JPY as these assumed
to float freely given their role as potential exchange rate targets by other
countries.
number of countries under intermediate pegs remains substantial in 2018 (roughly 60%
of the sample considering both USD and EUR), and the ‘intensity curves’ are relatively
smooth - highlighting the importance of considering intermediate pegs across a broad
spectrum. Figure A.2 in the Appendix shows 2000-2018 changes in peg intensity by
currency. Against the USD, many countries which were hard pegs in 2000 have relaxed
their policy by 2018, most of them following de facto intermediate policies. At the same
time, most countries did increase the pegging weight attributed to the EUR. Focusing on
USD pegs, Romania, South Korea, China, Brazil, Mexico, and Thailand round out the
countries exhibiting the largest changes. Over this time period, Romania transitioned
from a hard peg to the USD to targeting the EUR, explaining the near-maximal drop
in USD peg intensity coinciding with a large rise in EUR peg intensity. In 2015, China
begun transitioning from a hard de facto USD peg amidst the country’s push to globalize
it’s currency, while the other countries are notable emerging markets that have adopted
inflation targeting monetary policy over the period, thereby allowing market forces to
increasingly drive their currency movements.
An important possibility to consider is whether countries which moved away from the
USD are switching to EUR as a base currency to peg against. The estimated correlation
between 2000-2018 changes in USD peg intensities and 2000-2018 changes in EUR peg
intensities is equal to -0.23 (t=-1.64) but not highly significant in the statistical sense.
The weak negative correlation implies that changes in USD peg intensity can explain
11
Figure 3: Peg intensities in 2000 vs 2018, vis-a-vis USD (left),
EUR (right)
Annual 2000 and 2018 estimates of Ŵ b
it
are 4-quarter averages.
roughly 5% of the variation in changes in EUR peg intensity. The evidence, therefore
suggests that base currency substitution was not a major factor driving transitions in
exchange rate policy.
Taking a look at exchange rate intensities over time, I plot 4-quarter rolling average
USD and EUR intensities for selected countries in Figure A.3 and aggregate, cross-country
averages in Figure A.4. Romania’s early-2000’s transition from a USD peg to a EUR peg
becomes clear. Singapore has steadily reduced it’s peg against the USD to nearly zero,
through for a large part of the 2000’s the country seems to have targeted a basket with
partial pegs against both the EUR and USD.
Switzerland had a strong yet imperfect peg against the EUR over most of the sample
period, though the EUR peg intensity dropped considerably during the 2011 European
Debt Crisis, then returning to high levels until Switzerland surprised the world with their
sudden re-valuation in January 2015 when the Franc appreciated roughly 30% against
the Euro. Since then, the peg intensity has continued to steadily weaken. China’s hard
peg to the USD is very apparent in the early 2000’s (despite the government claiming
to target a basket). The country continued to administer a strong (though not perfect)
USD peg up until Q4 2015, and since then the USD peg intensity has dropped sharply
to less than 0.10 amidst the country’s push towards introducing the Yuan as a global
currency. This drop is not substituted with increased EUR intensity.17
Overall trends in USD and EUR peg intensities across all countries in the sample are
shown in Figure A.4. What is clear is that the average USD peg intensity has crept lower
steadily over the past 20 years (from over 0.60 to below 0.45), with the exception of 2011
17It is also possible that this sharp drop in China’s targeting the USD was driven by the U.S.-China
trade war in an effort to insulate against the effects of tariffs.
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during the European Debt Crisis where a sharp rise in USD peg intensity appears to
have been driven by countries substituting away from targeting the EUR, which realized
a coinciding sharp drop in intensity. Moreover the persistent rise of intermediate pegs
accompanying a persistent scarcity of pure floats are not supportive of the Two Cor-
ners hypothesis, highlighting the important need to more carefully study middle-ground
exchange rate policies.
The question of what might determine a country’s choice of exchange rate policy is a
natural (extensively-studied) follow-up. Many potential factors might drive this choice.
For example, Edwards [1996] finds that political economy factors play a major role, as the
choice between fixed and floating is related to the country’s historical degree of political
instability, the probability of abandoning a pegged rate, and the policy objectives of
the domestic monetary authorities. Devereux and Engel [1998] argue that what matters
is whether prices are set in the currency of the consumer or producer. Recent studies
also consider the choice of operating an intermediate exchange rate regime. Ito and
Kawai [2014] suggest that countries opt for more flexible exchange rate regimes when the
country has: greater international reserves, more trading partners, a lower proportion
of commodity exports, and greater domestic savings, while McCauley and Chan [2014]
report that the composition of foreign exchange reserves strongly explains cross-country
variation in (continuous measures of) exchange rate peg intensities.
Armed with continuous peg intensities against the USD and EUR, the two globally
dominant base currencies, one can effectively measure monetary policy spillovers with
finer granularity. That is, we can shift our attention from the corners of exchange rate
policy to interior choices, i.e. intermediate regimes. The following analysis leverages these
estimated peg intensities to study whether and to what degree monetary policy spillovers
are consistent with the Trilemma, particularly under intermediate pegs.
5 Testing the Trilemma: Empirical Strategy
There are a number of steps that must be taken before arriving that the final econometric
specification to test monetary policy spillovers. For illustrative purposes, consider a
modified Uncovered Interest Rate Parity (UIP) condition which allows for both open and
closed capital flow regimes:
Rit = (1− τit)(Rbit + Et[∆eib,t+1] + ρit) + τitR
∗
it, τit ∈ {0, 1}, (3)
where whether country i administers closed (open) capital flow is given by τit: a value
of 0 for open and 1 if closed. Under free capital flow (τit = 0), the interest rate of
country i, Rit should equal the interest rate of the base country, Rbit plus the expected
percent appreciation of base country b’s currency vis-a-vis country i’s currency denoted
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Et[∆eib,t+1], plus a risk premium ρit. Under a perfectly credible hard peg, Et[∆eib,t+1]
equals zero. So under a hard peg and assuming a zero risk premium and τ = 0, its easy to
see that Rit = Rbit. That is, country i does not have any monetary autonomy as the base
country interest rate fully passes through. In contrast, under a flexible exchange rate
and/or time-varying risk premia, Rit can indeed deviate from the base country interest
rate. The Trilemma implies that limiting capital flows by introducing capital controls
can reduce this policy pass-through and grant greater monetary autonomy. This is shown
in Equation 3 under τit = 1. Under a closed capital account, UIP no longer applies and
country i’s interest rate is fully independent, Rit = R
∗
it.
A major simplifying assumption of the illustration just presented is that exchange
rates can be either fixed or floating, and capital controls can either be open or closed.
Despite this unrealistic assumption, most studies on the policy Trilemma are restricted
to such cases. By leveraging continuous measures of peg intensity, I aim to relax this
assumption. Second, interest rate levels tend to be very persistent, thus raising the
issue of potential unit roots and spurious regression results. Therefore, following the
literature, we test for the monetary pass-through using interest rate changes. Third, as
in Han and Wei [2018], it is important to condition interest rates on domestic variables
which the central bank may target as we wish to capture interest rate changes exclusively
driven by the Trilemma and remove bias driven by policy responses to domestic economic
conditions. Additionally, it is crucial to condition base country interest rates on domestic
variables (Jordà et al. [2020]) to identify base country monetary policy movements that
are unrelated to domestic economic conditions.
5.1 Identification of Base Country Monetary Shocks
The base interest rates under consideration are the U.S. and E.U. (ECB) policy interest
rates, b ∈ {US,EU}.18 A key identifying assumption here and in the broad majority of
related studies is that all other countries take changes in U.S. and E.U. monetary policy as
exogenous. That is, country i’s economic condition does not factor into monetary policy
decisions for the U.S. and E.U., where only domestic conditions strictly determine the
interest rate. Though plausible, this assumption may or may not be reasonably satisfied
at all times. For example, a country’s business cycle may be correlated with that of the
base country. Therefore, as a robustness check I also consider a measure of unanticipated
U.S. monetary policy shocks later in Section 9.4.
To remove potential endogeneity arising from policy changes driven by domestic eco-
nomic conditions, instead of using interest rate changes directly, I first run the following
regression resembling a Taylor-type rule where the monetary policy responds to output




∆Rbt = α1 + α2∆ybt + α3∆πbt +Db,ZLB[β1 + β2∆ybt + β2∆πbt] + Zbt, (4)
where ∆Rbt is the quarterly change in interest rate for base country b, in this case
either the U.S. or E.U. ∆ybt and ∆πbt are year-over-year GDP growth and inflation,
respectively. Because of the drastic change in monetary policy after hitting the Zero Lower
Bound (ZLB), I allow for a structural break in the regression coefficients conditional on
base country interest rates hitting their effective lower bound. This is captured by an
indicator variable, Db,ZLB which takes a value of 1 if base country b’s policy rate is at the
effective lower bound, and 0 otherwise. For the U.S., the interest rate is at the effective
lower bound when the policy rate is 0.125% or lower, and for the E.U. when the policy rate
equals 0%. For both countries, the lower bound period is persistent, occuring mostly after
the 2008 Financial Crisis. The estimated residual policy rate change Ẑbt ∈ {ẐUS,t, ẐEU,t}
– cleaned of domestic confounders – is then a measure of base country monetary policy
changes that are uncorrelated with domestic economic conditions.
Naturally, most identification approaches come with drawbacks. For example, while
this method allows for a structural break at the ZLB, during period of zero rates, there
is nearly zero variation in the policy rate, and unconventional policies dominated the
central bank toolkit. Moreover, the ‘residual’ approach may not always be sufficient for
identifying the exogenous component of monetary policy. To validate the robustness of
the results, I apply two additional approaches for estimating Ẑbt to capture changes in the
monetary policy stance despite at the ZLB. First, I replace ∆Rbt for the U.S. and E.U.
with their respective shadow rates (Wu and Xia [2016]). Second, for the U.S. specifically,
I construct a series of identified monetary policy shocks from Fed Fund futures data which
yields an entirely different series of policy innovations. Results under these alternative
schemes are reported in Section 9.3 and Section 9.4, respectively.
The second step required for identification is motivated by the IV strategy of Jordà
et al. [2015] and Jordà et al. [2020], and more generally consistent with the broader
literature on the policy Trilemma. That is, the effect of base country b’s monetary policy
shock on country i’s interest rate depends on: country i’s peg intensity with respect to
the base currency of country b given by Ŵ bit, and country i’s capital account openness,
Kit. Both of these variables lie within [0, 1], where 0 indicates fully floating exchange
rate/closed capital accounts, and 1 indicates fully pegged exchange rate and full capital
openness. Taken together, the variable of interest in the baseline regression specification
will be the interaction term Ẑbt × Ŵ
b
it × Kit. The key difference between this measure
and prevailing studies is that here, the variable measuring exchange rate regime, Ŵ bit is
continuous and lies within [0, 1].19 Importantly, the identification assumption that must
19Jordà et al. [2015] defines exogenous monetary policy shocks in the same way – as the interaction
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be satisfied is monotonicity:
∂E[∆Rit|x]
∂[Ẑbt × Ŵ bit ×Kit]
≥ 0. (5)
What the assumption requires is that the change in country i’s interest rate (condi-
tional on controls, x), is increasing in the denominator. Think of peg intensity and capital
openness as measures of how exposed country i’s interest rate is to the base country’s,
and we ideally, wish to compare two identical countries in terms of fundamentals and
capital controls, but varying in exchange rate flexibility. For zero exposure, either Ŵ bit or
Kit must equal zero. That is, the country must administer either a pure float, or a closed
capital account for complete monetary autonomy – precisely what the Trilemma implies.
Conversely, exposure to the base country’s monetary policy is conditionally maximized
(i.e. minimal monetary autonomy) when Ŵ bit and Kit equal 1; when country i admin-
isters a hard peg under free capital flows. The interaction term imposes the structural
assumption that the Trilemma trade-offs are linear in that monetary autonomy linearly
decreases as exchange rate flexibility or capital account openness rises.
5.2 Econometric Specification
The baseline regression to be tested is:
∆Rit = αi + φ1∆Ri,t−1 + φ2∆yit + φ3∆πit + φ4∆RERit
+ φ5∆V IXt + φ6∆R̄t
+ γUS[ẐUS,t × Ŵ
$
it ×Kit] + γEU [ẐEU,t × Ŵ
e
it ×Kit] + ǫit. (6)
The baseline regression assumes that country i’s interest rate responds according to
an open economy Taylor-type rule (Aizenman et al. [2011], Engel [2011], Han and Wei
[2014], Han and Wei [2018]) and conditions on key domestic variables which the policy
rate may react to. Changes in country i’s policy rate are regressed on lagged policy
rates,20 ∆Ri,t−1, nominal GDP growth ∆yit, changes in inflation ∆πit, and changes in the
log real exchange rate ∆RERit vis-a-vis the USD. Positive changes in the real exchange
rate indicate country i depreciation. Including the real exchange rate also will capture any
possible evidence of Fear of Floating, one phenomena which challenges the sustainability
of the base country’s monetary policy change, the exchange rate regime and degree of capital openness
- but using binary measures of exchange rate regimes.
20The specification taking the form of a dynamic panel model is well known to suffer from Nickell [1981]
bias when the time dimension is small. However, our quarterly sample provides T ranging from mid-40 to
mid-70 depending on the sub-sample and country. Judson and Owen [1999] show through Monte-Carlo
studies that the LSDV estimator performs well in comparison with GMM and other estimators when
T=30.
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of the Trilemma (Calvo and Reinhart [2002]). The choice of real exchange rates vis-a-vis
the USD is intentional: it is the most relevant exchange rate, as the USD dominates
among invoicing currencies in international trade, and is also the currency of choice in
international finance (Gopinath [2015], Maggiori et al. [2019], ECB [2019]).21
Additionally the validity of the Trilemma has been actively debated in light of new ev-
idence of a global financial cycle (Rey [2015], Miranda-Agrippino and Rey [2020]), hence
the specification also controls for global factors: log changes in the VIX index given by
∆V IXt, and ∆R̄t which denotes changes in the global average interest rate.
22 The merged
panel data are unbalanced as data sources vary in their coverage (Table A.1 includes a
description of countries along with the number of interest rate observations per country).
Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Its worth briefly pointing out that
the monetary shocks Ẑb,t and peg intensities Ŵ
b
it are both estimated, and therefore sub-
ject to the classical case of measurement error (errors-in-variables problem). Because the
measurement error is embedded in independent variables, under the standard assump-
tion that the measurement error is random and uncorrelated with the independent and
dependent variables in the regression, this biases the coefficients towards zero, and biases
the associated t-statistic downwards. Measurement error therefore induces attenuation
bias such that the resulting monetary spillover estimates are likely to be relatively con-
servative in the sense that they would otherwise be larger in the absence of measurement
error.23
The final two terms preceding the residual ǫit of Equation 6 are the focus of this
study. Coefficients γUS and γEU capture the degree of spillover from base interest rates
(U.S. monetary policy and ECB monetary policy, respectively) to country i’s interest
rate. Given a foreign monetary policy shock to the base country, Ẑbt, the total spillover
to country i is an increasing function of peg intensity and capital account openness,
γb[Ŵ bit ×Kit].
24
A potential drawback of the regression specification is the imposed homogeneity of
coefficients across countries. For example, weights on Taylor Rule coefficients might differ
21Moreover, real effective exchange rate changes are highly correlated with USD exchange rate changes
such that using either do not result in meaningful changes to estimates of monetary spillovers.
22The global average interest rate is computed each period t as the cross-section average of ∆Rit across
all countries i, excluding base countries. It proxies for the common factor in interest rate fluctuations
and absorbs common trends across countries (Pesaran [2006]).
23The way to adjust standard errors when a regressor is estimated typically varies on a case-by-case
basis. Often however, bootstrapping the entire estimation procedure (first stage plus second stage, etc.)
is done. However, when there are many stages or many estimations in a single bootstrap round, this
approach can become exceedingly intensive in terms of computation time. The approach applied in this
paper is one of those scenarios: in the first stage, I estimate for each of 46 countries, and for each quarter,
peg intensities, which then enter into a second stage panel regression (the first stage yielding roughly
3,450 estimates). This would then have to be bootstrapped hundreds of times.
24Ito and Kawai [2012] and Ito and Kawai [2014] apply a similar method to estimate a country’s
monetary independence, but they do not pre-condition base country interest rates on domestic variables
or account for financial openness.
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across countries which aim to prioritize different policy objectives: emerging markets may
prioritize targeting the real exchange rate, while this may not be an objective at all among
some advanced economies (Aizenman et al. [2011] and Ahmed et al. [2019]). Despite this
limitation, much of the literature stands by the pooled panel regression specification as it
buys considerable statistical power when dealing with cross-country panels25. In support
of the homogeneous coefficients restriction, Han and Wei [2018] find that after estimat-
ing country-specific Taylor-type regressions, weights assigned to inflation for inflation
targeting countries and non-inflation targeting countries are not statistically different.
However to account for potential heterogeneity in regression coefficients, I estimate the
regression on advanced and emerging market sub-samples of countries along with the full
sample. Moreover in Section 7 I allow the coefficients to be estimated separately across
countries binned by exchange rate peg intensity, reflecting the possibility that countries
with greater monetary autonomy under a flexible exchange rate can put more weight on
domestic policy objectives compared to countries administering stronger pegs (Klein and
Shambaugh [2015]).
5.3 Tests and Hypotheses
The policy Trilemma assumes that γb = 1 from Equation 6. That is, under a perfect
peg and open capital flows (Ŵ bit = 1, Kit = 1), interest rate pass-through should be
one-for-one, while under a pure float (Ŵ bit = 0) or closed capital flows (Kit = 0), there is
no interest rate pass-through (i.e. complete monetary autonomy). However, in practice
it is difficult to expect this assumption to hold. First, the policy Trilemma relies on UIP
being satisfied, but there is extensive empirical evidence of UIP being violated in the data.
Second, as Klein and Shambaugh [2015] show, one cannot expect Trilemma-consistent
pass-through if country i’s interest rate changes are correlated with other factors that
influence their policy rate such as expected exchange rate changes, risk premia or global
shocks.
Nonetheless, there are a number of valuable tests that can be conducted. If γb is sta-
tistically significant and positive, that itself is evidence in favor of the Trilemma despite
imperfect pass-through. A positive coefficient implies a statistically significant relation-
ship between base country policy rates and country i’s policy rates which strengthens as
the exchange rate policy becomes increasingly rigid, or as capital accounts become more
open. A continuous measure of exchange rate regime will let us infer whether intermediate
exchange rate regimes offer intermediate degrees of monetary policy autonomy.
Given the linear form of the interaction term, it is simple to calculate spillovers under
any combination of exchange rate flexibility and capital account openness. To focus on
25Obstfeld et al. [2005], Klein and Shambaugh [2015], Han and Wei [2018], Obstfeld et al. [2019] all
employ the pooled specification in their baseline analysis.
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the trade-off between monetary autonomy and exchange rate flexibility, the discussion
focuses on the case where Kit = 1, or conditional on an open capital account for ease of
interpretation. This way, we can make comparisons on the monetary autonomy between
two hypothetical countries, both with open capital accounts, but different exchange rate
policies. A similar design, though with discrete exchange rate regimes, is taken in Han
and Wei [2018]. In fact, this is not a binding constraint – we can fix the capital account
openness to any value of Kit and still infer the monetary autonomy - exchange flexibility
trade-off between countries given the same capital account openness. This point is par-
ticularly important to note because the scenario of Kit = 1 may not be borne out in the
data particularly among emerging markets. Fortunately, under the assumptions of the
Trilemma (i.e. monetary spillovers are linearly increasing in Kit), the case of Kit = 1 is
easily inferred from the model even for emerging markets.
Different coefficient estimates of γUS and γEU suggest that monetary policy spillovers
are heterogenous, and may be different depending on the base currency. Finally, a sig-
nificant coefficient on both γUS and γEU in a regression including both suggest (but do
not conclude) that basket pegs, where the same total weight W bit is allocated across base
currencies, can offer diversification benefits compared to a hard peg (where the equivalent
total weight is allocated to a single currency) against a single base currency so long as
the base country monetary policies are not perfectly correlated with one another. For
example, a country targeting a basket of two exchange rates with weights of 50% on each,
would be imperfectly exposed to both monetary policies, versus committing 100% weight
towards single currency. Despite equal total foreign exposure (weights sum to 1 in both
cases), the country targeting a basket is subject to less monetary pass-through, on aver-
age, from base countries in each period so long as the two base countries do not conduct
synchronized monetary policy. If the two base country monetary policies are imperfectly
correlated, pass-through is is reduced under a basket peg for any given quarter. If the
two base country monetary policies were perfectly correlated, then there would be no
difference between the two weighting schemes (and in fact, one of the RHS regressors,
either the US or EU monetary policy shock, would drop out of the regression). The latter
two tests would bring novel insights to the literature.
A key assumption of the regression specified in Equation 6 is the implicit linearity
imposed on monetary pass-through. The effect of monetary pass-through implied by
γb[Ŵ bit ×Kit] is linear in peg intensity and capital account openness, and it follows that
under open capital accounts, the trade-off between monetary autonomy and exchange rate
stability is also linear. The Trilemma trade-offs however are not necessarily required to be
linear, though have been assumed to be so in some studies (Ito and Kawai [2014]). There is
no consensus on the linearity of Trilemma trade-offs. Aizenman et al. [2010] and Herwartz
and Roestel [2017] test the linearity assumption and find supportive evidence. In contrast,
Obstfeld et al. [2019] find non-linear effects of (non-monetary) spillovers under varying
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degrees of exchange rate flexibility. Because of the important policy implications of (non)
linearity, I explore this issue in more detail in Section 7 by exploiting the continuous
nature of peg intensity measures.
6 Baseline Results
Table 2: Baseline Regression Results: All Countries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ŵ bit Ŵ
b
it (RA, 2) Ŵ
b








γ̂US 0.351*** 0.370*** 0.402*** 0.486*** 0.412** 0.390***
(0.108) (0.124) (0.136) (0.177) (0.147) (0.098)
γ̂EU 0.511*** 0.486*** 0.581*** 0.328* 0.703*** 0.392***
(0.124) (0.133) (0.178) (0.178) (0.116) (0.120)
Adj. R2 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.15 0.16
F-Statistic 69.51 58.77 47.31 47.80 44.91 75.25
N×T 2,882 2,532 1,937 2,532 1,727 2,909
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE N N N Y N N
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification
of Equation 6. Estimation period: Q2 2000 - Q4 2018. Column 5 estimates
on the sub-sample of intermediate pegs (peg intensities between 0 and 1,
for both U.S. and E.U.). Column 6 uses W̃ b
it
, the estimated peg intensi-
ties (Equation 2) after controlling for common shocks. Within R-squared
reported.
The results for the full sample of countries are reported in Table 2. The first three
columns represent different variants of the peg intensity estimate Ŵ bit. The second and
third columns use a 2-quarter and 4-quarter rolling average of Ŵ bit, respectively denoted
with (RA, 2) and (RA, 4), to replace the unsmoothed measure (column 1). Smoothing out
the peg intensity estimate with past observations helps makes a more conservative choice
to ensure that pegs, which tend to be persistent, are well-established (Jordà et al. [2015],
Jordà et al. [2020]). Moreover, smoothing even over 2 quarters helps ensure that results
are not driven by outliers and helps eliminate episodes of opportunistic pegging and
sudden short-lived devaluations. Regardless, estimates are consistent and significance
is broadly robust across columns. Column 4 reports results after substituting a time
fixed effect for global controls. Column 5 reports results the sub-sample of country-
quarter observations under intermediate pegs, and Column 6 reports results under the
augmented peg intensity measure, W̃ bit for additional robustness.
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6.1 All Countries
Significant non-zero estimates on both γ̂US and γ̂EU indicate Trilemma-consistent mon-
etary spillovers from both base countries to others (Table 2). Under free capital flows
(Kit = 1), as peg intensity rises (falls), the pass-through of base country interest rates
strengthens (weakens). Note that the effects are statistically different from both 0 and
1, implying imperfect Trilemma pass-through. That is, under a perfect peg and free
capital flows, a 1 percentage point change in the base country (US, EU) interest rate is
associated with interest rates roughly (+0.37, +0.49) percentage points higher (Column
2). Column 4 introduces time fixed effects as a robustness check - the effects of monetary
pass-through broadly hold under this specification as well, and the results are robust to
using the augmented measure W̃ bit.
6.2 Advanced economies
Table 3 reports estimates for the sub-sample of advanced economies. Both base country
Trilemma coefficients are highly significant across the varying specifications of peg inten-
sity and remain robust to both country and time fixed effects. Both U.S. and E.U. base
country pass-through is roughly 0.70 for advanced economies, much higher than it is for
the full sample. In fact, in many instances the confidence interval includes 1 – indicative
of near-perfect monetary policy pass-through when targeting either base currency. More-
over, a hypothetical advanced economy with free capital flow targeting a 50-50 USD-EUR
basket would import about half of each country’s monetary policy change. So long as
these policy rate changes in the U.S. and E.U. do not occur simultaneously, targeting a
basket would appear to offer potential diversification benefits.
6.3 Emerging markets
Table 4 reports pass-through estimates for the sub-sample of emerging markets. Across
all four specifications (columns 1 to 4), coefficient estimates suggest positive yet imperfect
pass-through, but there is little evidence of significant monetary policy spillovers from
the E.U., despite a number of emerging market economies pegging, at some point, to
the Euro.26 In contrast, the effect of U.S. monetary policy is statistically significant in
most specifications, ranging from 0.26 to 0.44, indicating that under a perfect peg and
free capital flows, monetary spillovers from the U.S. are imperfect, with emerging market
interest rates rising on average +0.35 percentage points for every +1 percentage point
rise in U.S. interest rates.
26These countries include but are not limited to: Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary.
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Table 3: Baseline Regression Results: Advanced Economies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ŵ bit Ŵ
b
it (RA, 2) Ŵ
b
it (RA, 4) Ŵ
b
it (RA, 2) Ŵ
b




γ̂US 0.656*** 0.742*** 0.797*** 0.701*** 0.737*** 0.529***
(0.213) (0.209) (0.220) (0.198) (0.178) (0.159)
γ̂EU 0.799*** 0.759*** 0.700*** 0.422*** 0.663*** 0.701***
(0.071) (0.117) (0.131) (0.121) (0.088) (0.076)
Adj. R2 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.186 0.40 0.41
F-Statistic 70.40 62.91 46.60 39.59 40.04 68.5
N×T 746 644 486 644 444 777
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE N N N Y N N
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification
of Equation 6. Estimation period Q2 2000 - Q4 2018. Advanced Economies
sub-sample only. Column 5 estimates on the sub-sample of intermediate pegs
(peg intensities between 0 and 1, for both U.S. and E.U.). Column 6 uses
W̃ b
it
, the estimated peg intensities (Equation 2) after controlling for common
shocks. Within R-squared reported.
6.4 Intermediate pegs
Column 5 of Tables 2, 3 and 4 consider the sub-sample of country-quarter observations
which do not include pure floats or hard pegs (i.e. excluding values of 0 or 1 for Ŵ bit).
This is done to verify whether corner policies are driving the results of the regression
tests, or whether the range of intermediate pegs actually offer a spectrum of monetary
autonomy. Across the full sample, the effects of both U.S. and E.U. peg intensity remain
highly significant upon omitting corner policy observations, suggesting that the intensive
margin of peg intensity also matters for monetary policy. The advanced economy sub-
group signals the same message: the effects of monetary policy pass-through hold for
both the intensive and extensive margin of exchange rate regimes.
For the emerging market sub-group, the significance of the coefficient estimate on
γ̂US disappears (though remains positive) when removing observations containing corner
policies (Column 5, Table 4). This may have several interpretations. One is that across
emerging markets, intermediate pegs may not offer intermediate monetary autonomy,
but rather disproportionately greater monetary autonomy than a hard peg, indicating
a non-linear relationship between exchange rate flexibility and monetary autonomy: a
country which introduces a little bit of exchange rate flexibility can potentially buy a
lot of monetary independence. There are other possible interpretations as well: for these
countries, increasing flexibility of the exchange rate might disproportionately increase
the sensitivity of monetary policy to non-Trilemma factors (domestic objectives, Fear
of Floating, financial cycles or commodity cycles, risk premia, etc.). So, while the base
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Table 4: Baseline Regression Results: Emerging Markets
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ŵ bit Ŵ
b
it (RA, 2) Ŵ
b
it (RA, 4) Ŵ
b
it (RA, 2) Ŵ
b




γ̂US 0.266** 0.265** 0.263* 0.444** 0.165 0.356***
(0.108) (0.121) ( 0.135) (0.198) (0.143) (0.116)
γ̂EU 0.199 0.181 0.458 0.066 0.868*** 0.064
( 0.167) (0.179) (0.322) (0.218) (0.261) (0.177)
Adj. R2 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.04 0.13 0.14
F-Statistic 46.09 39.18 31.00 32.57 29.94 49.98
N×T 2,135 1,887 1,451 1,887 1,282 2,131
Country FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Time FE N N N Y N N
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification
of Equation 6. Estimation period Q2 2000 - Q4 2018. Emerging Markets
sub-sample only. Column 5 estimates on the sub-sample of intermediate
pegs (peg intensities between 0 and 1, for both U.S. and E.U.). Column
6 uses W̃ b
it
, the estimated peg intensities (Equation 2) after controlling for
common shocks. Within R-squared reported.
country’s monetary policy spillovers are less influential, the costly rising importance across
other external factors may offset any benefits from monetary autonomy. In the next
section, we will investigate these non-linearities further, and allow regression coefficients
to vary across peg intensities to possibly reflect changing weights on policy objectives as
countries move from pegs to floats.
Finally, in an interesting twist when considering only intermediate peg observations,
monetary spillovers under the Trilemma with regards to E.U. monetary policy becomes
statistically significant (γ̂EU), implying that under intermediate peg intensities, E.U.
monetary policy passes through to countries which partially target the Euro and the
pass-through increases as the country approaches a peg. However surprisingly, hard pegs
to the Euro do not exhibit Trilemma-consistent monetary spillovers in emerging markets.
6.5 Discussion
To summarize, significant evidence of monetary policy spillovers is present in both ad-
vanced Economies and emerging Markets, but estimated monetary policy pass-through
is considerably stronger among advanced economies. For the full sample and advanced
economies in particular, there is robust evidence consistent with Klein and Shambaugh
[2015] that the Trilemma holds under interior policy choices (i.e. peg intensities between
0 and 1), potentially allowing for partial monetary autonomy under a managed float.
These results validate the prevailing literature testing the Trilemma. Both monetary pol-
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icy spillovers and overall regression fit (R2) are lower for the emerging markets sub-sample
compared to advanced economies. This could be due to the presence of important factors
which are correlated with country i’s interest rate. For example, monetary pass-through
estimates may be low in emerging markets because risk premia tend to be highly volatile
(Kalemli-Ozcan [2019]). Fear of Floating and Global Financial Cycles, operating through
the real exchange rate and financial conditions respectively, may also impact country i’s
policy choices (Calvo and Reinhart [2002] and Rey [2015]). Some emerging markets
are heavily reliant on commodity trade, hence exposing themselves to commodity cycles
which in turn can influence policy objectives (Aizenman et al. [2011]). Finally, recent
evidence suggests that the burgeoning debt positions of emerging markets (and advanced
economies) brought in by unprecedented monetary easing after the 2008 Financial Crisis
may be interacting with monetary policy objectives (Ahmed et al. [2019]).
A new insight is the significance of joint pass-through from both U.S. and E.U. mon-
etary policy – bearing a key policy implication: basket pegs can potentially mitigate
monetary policy spillovers from a single country occurring under a unitary peg by tak-
ing on monetary spillovers from an additional country, effectively diversifying spillover
risk. Interestingly, Emerging Markets do not seem to exhibit Trilemma-consistent mon-
etary policy spillovers under intermediate pegs. However, this may imply that among
these countries, moving from a hard peg to an intermediate peg buys a disproportion-
ate amount of monetary independence – either unconditionally or relatively by assigning
greater weight on other policy objectives. Potential non-linearities in the exchange rate
regime – monetary spillover function are explored in the next section.
7 Non-linear Trilemma Trade-offs
Thus far, I’ve provided evidence confirming that monetary spillovers subject to the
Trilemma are present in both advanced economies and emerging markets. However,
as I mentioned, the regression design implicitly imposes that the spillover country i faces
is linear in exchange rate flexibility: γb × Ŵ
b
it, given free capital flows (Kit = 1) and a
unitary monetary shock (Ẑbt = 1, though the size of the shock can be arbitrary). We
saw, however, that the Trilemma seems to hold for intermediate pegs among advanced
economies and corner policies appear to drive the significant results among emerging mar-
kets. This brings the implication of linear monetary spillovers into question – a research
area which has received limited attention.
In this section we further explore monetary policy pass-through under intermediate
peg intensities, asking specifically whether the relationship with exchange rate flexibility
is non-linear. Testing for non-linearities in U.S. and E.U. spillovers jointly is not feasible
under the baseline regression design due to the size of the sample.27 Therefore, I focus
27It would require interacting all covariates twice, and sub-samples already are limited in the number
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first on non-linearities in U.S. monetary policy. Then, I modify the regression analysis
to a setting which can jointly analyze the linearity of monetary spillovers under interme-
diate exchange rate regimes for both U.S. and E.U. Finally to further test whether the
observed non-linearities are statistically significant, I extend the baseline regression to
a Generalized Additive Model (GAM) specification adopted from the machine learning
literature.
7.1 Peg intensity bins
I start simple with a baseline analysis which allows the researcher to investigate how well
the imposed linearity assumption of the original specification is satisfied without adding
complexity. To do this, I relax the linear-implied specification of the baseline regression
(Equation 6) and estimate separate sub-samples, sorting by peg intensity. Again, using
the 2-quarter rolling average peg intensities, Ŵ bit (RA, 2). Country-quarter observations
are sorted into the following 6 bins:
Pure Float Hard Peg
1 2 3 4 5 6
W bit [0,0.1] (0.1,.30] (0.30,.50] (0.50,0.70] (0.70,0.90] (0.90,1]
The regression specification must be modified due to the more limited number of
observations per sub-sample after dividing the data into 6 separate groups. Moreover,
I only consider peg intensities to one base country at a time, starting with the U.S
(Results for E.U. shocks can be found in Table A.4). Constructing bins which condition
both on U.S. and E.U. peg intensity would lead to too few observations per group.28 The
regression takes the following form:
∆Rit = αi+θ1∆yit+θ2∆πit+θ3∆RERit+θ4∆V IXt+θ5∆R̄t+γUS[ẐUS,t×Kit]+ ǫit.
(7)
there are two key differences between Equation 7 and the previous specification, Equa-
tion 6. The first is that the lagged dependent variable is removed from the RHS. This
is due to data limitations – by constructing sub-groups using more refined exchange rate
of observations they include.
28One could take Equation 6 and interact Ẑb with binned peg intensities, which would potentially allow
for both U.S. and E.U. to be jointly tested for non-linear pass-through. However, this comes at the cost
of constraining all other regression coefficients to be pooled together across the entire sample. Because
policy weights can vary across countries which peg or don’t peg, It’s crucial to allow for coefficient
flexibility, something that can be achieved by estimating on sub-samples. Results from this approach are
reported in Table A.4 and are broadly consistent with other specifications.
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regime categories, each group will not have sufficient data along the time dimension to
reduce the bias that a fixed effects dynamic panel specification generates. Moreover, each
observation is now increasingly valuable for statistical power, and therefore lost obser-
vations from including a lagged dependent variable becomes costly for inference. On a
positive note, since the regression specification is in interest rate changes the data is not
persistent, thereby excluding a lagged dependent variable will not influence the results in
a meaningful way.29
The second change is related to peg intensity. First, I only consider U.S. monetary
policy spillovers, so the variable capturing shocks from the E.U. is removed. Second, peg
intensity, ŴUSit is removed from the trio of interactions. This is simply because now we
condition the entire sample on ŴUSit by estimating separate regressions per intensity bin.
An advantage of this specification aside from its simplicity is that, by running separate
bin-specific regressions, we allow all of the coefficients to be heterogeneous across peg
intensity bins, lending to more realistic and flexible inference, and addressing some of the
limitations mentioned previously over the original pooled specification.
7.2 All countries
Table 5 reports spillover estimates from U.S. monetary policy across bins (γ̂US), but also
reports coefficients on the other covariates. This way we can infer whether monetary
spillovers are non-linear in peg intensity, but also if greater monetary autonomy indeed
translates to greater weights on domestic variables, namely inflation or output. The
sixth row reports the spillover coefficients given by γ̂US, and as the Trilemma implies, the
coefficients roughly increase with peg intensity, with hard pegs having the largest spillover
coefficients (0.48). However, there is evidence of potential non-linearity in spillovers based
on peg intensities. Under weak to moderate peg intensities ranging of 0 to 0.50 (bins 1
to 3), evidence of monetary spillovers is statistically indifferent from zero – the same as
if under a fully floating policy. Evidence of monetary spillovers begin to manifest under
more rigid exchange rate policy (bins 4 to 6, peg intensities from 0.5 to 1). Moreover,
moderately strong pegs (bin 4 and 5) exhibit weaker monetary pass-through from the
U.S.compared to hard pegs (bin 6), 0.27 and 0.20 versus 0.48, respectively. This evidence
has policy implications, as it suggests that a little bit of exchange rate flexibility can
potentially buy a considerable degree of monetary autonomy, and that some exchange
rate stability can be bought without sacrificing monetary autonomy. Hence, the policy
Trilemma trade-off appears to be non-linear in the data, which differs from findings of
29If the regression was estimated in levels, removing the lagged dependent variable would very likely
have a major impact on coefficient estimates. To demonstrate the robustness of omitting the lagged
dependent variable in Equation 3, the coefficients on γ̂US and γ̂EU from Table 2 column 1 would change
from 0.351 to 0.364 and 0.511 to 0.500, respectively. The results remain statistically significant at the
1% level.
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Aizenman et al. [2010], Ito and Kawai [2014], and Herwartz and Roestel [2017].
Table 5: Spillover Effects across Peg Intensity Bins:
All Countries
Bin 1 2 3 4 5 6
ŴUSit (RA, 2) [0,0.1] (0.1,.30] (0.30,.50] (0.50,0.70] (0.70,0.90] (0.90,1]
∆πit 0.094*** 0.115*** 0.093*** 0.056 0.170*** 0.014*
(0.022) (0.043) (0.015) (0.044) (0.025) (0.007)
∆RERit 0.015 -0.009 0.003 0.017** -0.009 0.037**
(0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.018)
∆yit 0.029** 0.014 0.018 0.023 0.004 0.005
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.017) (0.006) (0.006)
∆V IXt 0.165** 0.302** 0.027 0.143 0.173* -0.138**
(0.070) (0.118) (0.074) (0.130) (0.088) (0.060)
∆R̄t -0.048 0.186 0.045 0.157* 0.023 0.020
(0.082) (0.121) (0.072) (0.088) (0.034) (0.045)
γ̂US 0.001 -0.010 0.142 0.276** 0.207*** 0.482***
(0.008) (0.092) (0.150) (0.139) (0.067) (0.132)
Adj. R2 0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.24 0.03
F-Statistic 7.16 6.15 10.39 8.91 26.68 9.84
N×T 385 356 409 356 389 684
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respec-
tively. Robust standard errors clustered at the Country level. Re-
gression specification of Equation 7. Estimation period Q2 2000
- Q4 2018. Country Fixed Effects included. Within adjusted
R-squared reported.
.
Moreover, coefficients on inflation tend to remain highly significant even under weak
to moderate peg intensity (bins 2 and 3) and are approximately 7 times larger than under
a hard peg (bin 6), suggesting that the gains from monetary autonomy are associated
with greater emphasis on targeting domestic policy objectives, particularly inflation, The
evidence suggests that pure floating is not necessary to achieve these gains. There is
also some evidence that under a both floating and fixed exchange rates, and a particular
intermediate pegs (bins 1, 2 and 5, 6), monetary policy is increasingly influenced by
global financial conditions proxied by changes in the VIX index. Under a flexible (fixed)
exchange rate, interest rate changes tend to respond positively (negatively) to changes in
the VIX. Because U.S. monetary policy tends to ease in the presence of heightened risk,
pegged monetary policy also falling when the VIX rises is consistent with the Trilemma.
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Under floating exchange rates, interest rates tend to rise – this is shown to be driven by
the emerging markets sub-sample, who tend to tighten monetary polciy, instead of ease,
during periods of heightened risk aversion in hopes of mitigating sudden capital outflows.
7.3 Advanced economies
Table 6 reports results across advanced economies. Again, monetary policy pass-through
estimates are nearly monotonically increasing in peg intensity. Hard pegs (bin 6) suggest
full pass-through with a coefficient of approximately 1. A weakly non-linear trade-off
between exchange rate regime and monetary autonomy is present among the advanced
economy sub-sample. A moderate to strong peg (bins 4 and 5) have spillover estimates
of 0.43 and 0.62, respectively, suggesting that giving up a little exchange rate stability
can cut monetary spillovers by 50%. Weaker pegs (bins 2 and 3) suggest even greater
gains in monetary autonomy which are not statistically different than monetary autonomy
under a floating exchange rate. The evidence suggests that a country which floats it’s
exchange rate can administer stabilization with little cost in monetary independence,
while a country running a hard peg can give up a little stability to buy a considerable
degree of monetary autonomy.
Across advanced economies, there is consistent evidence that intermediate exchange
rate regimes offer countries greater weight allocation to domestic objectives, particularly
output growth, but not inflation. Under floating and most intermediate exchange rate
regimes, output growth has a significant coefficient (bins 1, 2, 4 and 5) which is not
present under a hard peg. Evidence that global financial conditions have strong influence
over advanced economy interest rates is weak (mostly insignificant coefficient estimates
on ∆V IXit). Taking this point together with the results on domestic policy objectives,
it appears that for advanced economies, flexibility allows countries to focus on domestic
objectives without surrendering autonomy to global financial forces.
7.4 Emerging markets
Table 7 reports results for emerging markets. Across the emerging market sample under
hard pegs there is significant evidence of U.S. monetary pass-through, though imperfect
(coefficient of 0.367). Consistent with hard pegs to the U.S. Dollar, changes in the VIX
index are associated with interest rate cuts among hard pegging emerging markets. In
addition, these countries exhibit the strongest evidence of responding to real exchange
rate depreciation by hiking interest rates (Fear of Floating, Calvo and Reinhart [2002]).
Like their advanced economy counterparts, across bins monetary policy pass-through
appears non-linear in exchange rate peg intensity. Moving from a hard peg (bin 6) to
a moderately strong peg (bin 5) can reduce on average, interest rate pass-through by
two-thirds (from 0.37 to 0.13). Even more striking, is that bins 2 through 4 show no
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Table 6: Spillover Effects across Peg Intensity Bins:
Advanced Economies
Bin 1 2 3 4 5 6
ŴUSit (RA, 2) [0,0.1] (0.1,.30] (0.30,.50] (0.50,0.70] (0.70,0.90] (0.90,1]
∆πit 0.009 0.115** 0.101** 0.003 -0.099 0.092***
(0.024) (0.047) (0.049) (0.031) (0.068) (0.012)
∆yit 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.009 0.016*** 0.039*** 0.010
(0.017) (0.017) (0.013) (0.006) (0.009) (0.022)
∆RERit -0.001 -0.013 0.002 -0.015*** 0.024 0.011
(0.003) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.015) (0.025)
∆V IXt -0.093 0.062 -0.042 0.132* 0.043 -0.121
(0.069) (0.091) (0.054) (0.066) (0.119) (0.107)
∆R̄t 0.056** 0.129*** 0.043 0.003 -0.037** -0.031
(0.025) (0.042) (0.045) (0.033) (0.017) (0.039)
γ̂US 0.060* 0.012 0.137** 0.433*** 0.616*** 1.021***
(0.035) (0.065) (0.057) (0.030) (0.106) (0.115)
Adj. R2 0.17 0.28 0.01 0.09 0.30 0.56
F-Statistic 8.71 10.73 2.51 3.05 4.54 19.03
N×T 167 130 100 50 37 84
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respec-
tively. Robust standard errors clustered at the Country level. Re-
gression specification of Equation 7. Estimation period Q2 2000
- Q4 2018. Country Fixed Effects included. Advanced Economy
sub-sample only. Within adjusted R-squared reported.
.
evidence of significant monetary pass-through. That is, light pegs (bin 2) and even
moderate pegs (bins 3 and 4), on average, afford as much monetary autonomy as a free
floating exchange rate (bin 1). Emerging market monetary pass-through, in comparison
to advanced economies, appears much more non-linear in exchange rate flexibility.
Moderate pegs (bins 2 and 3) appear to put as much weight on targeting inflation as
free floating emerging markets (bin 1) and about 7 times as much weight compared under
a hard peg (bin 6). However, contrasting with advanced economies, there is evidence of
global financial conditions significantly impacting the monetary policy of emerging mar-
kets under free floats or moderate floats (bins 1 and 2). Therefore, flexible exchange rates
in emerging markets may be double-edged: while it buys monetary autonomy and greater
allocation to domestic objectives, policy choices will also be influenced by global factors
(Miranda-Agrippino and Rey [2020]). The sweet spot seemingly lies in the intermediate
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Table 7: Spillover Effects across Peg Intensity Bins:
Emerging Markets
Bin 1 2 3 4 5 6
ŴUSit (RA, 2) [0,0.1] (0.1,.30] (0.30,.50] (0.50,0.70] (0.70,0.90] (0.90,1]
∆πit 0.101*** 0.109** 0.093*** 0.058 0.172*** 0.014**
(0.022) (0.051) (0.015) (0.045) (0.026) (0.007)
∆yit 0.026* 0.005 0.020 0.023 0.003 0.005
(0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.007) (0.006)
∆RERit 0.026 -0.011 0.004 0.020** -0.010 0.040**
(0.018) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.018)
∆V IXt 0.296*** 0.438*** 0.060 0.151 0.175* -0.133**
(0.082) (0.155) (0.095) (0.154) (0.098) (0.067)
∆R̄t -0.122 0.223 0.047 0.232** 0.039 0.025
(0.146) (0.234) (0.105) (0.110) (0.041) (0.050)
γ̂US -0.140 0.051 0.1490 0.210 0.134** 0.367***
(0.214) (0.439) (0.333) (0.187) (0.060) (0.113)
Adj. R2 0.00 -0.07 0.04 0.06 0.26 0.01
F-Statistic 4.99 3.04 7.91 8.67 25.65 6.42
N×T 218 226 309 306 352 600
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respec-
tively. Robust standard errors clustered at the Country level. Re-
gression specification of Equation 7. Estimation period Q2 2000
- Q4 2018. Country Fixed Effects included. Emerging Market
sub-sample only. Within adjusted R-squared reported.
range – U.S. peg intensities between 0.30 and 0.5 – where policy rates are able to adjust
to domestic inflation, while buying a significant degree of monetary policy autonomy and
insulation from global financial shocks.
7.5 A Generalized Additive Model Approach
The baseline non-linear regression analysis sheds light on new evidence of a varying
trade-off between exchange rate flexibility and monetary independence, especially under
intermediate exchange rate regimes. However, without a formal test, we cannot conclude
whether the evidence points to an actual non-linear trade off, or whether the results are
caused by measurement noise. For example, it is possible that for emerging markets,
the relationship is indeed linear, but just so weak that under more flexible exchange
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Figure 4: U.S. spillover estimates γ̂US by Peg Intensity Bins
Peg intensity of 1 corresponds to pure float. Peg intensity of 6 corresponds to
hard peg vis-a-vis the USD. Estimates of γ̂US from Equation 7. Dark-shaded
bars are statistically significant at the 10% level.
rates it is too difficult to differentiate from a null effect. To test more rigorously for
non-linearities, I adopt a flexible non-paratmetric regression framework by estimating a
generalized additive model (GAM), an approach first introduced in the machine learning
and statistical learning literature by Hastie and Tibshirani [1990].
The concept is quite simple. Unlike linear regression which assumes that the de-
pendent variable and the independent variable are linearly related, under a GAM, the
relationship is allowed to be linear or a non-linear smooth function. Typically, this is
denoted as:
Yit = βX1it + s(X2it) + eit, (8)
whereX1it takes on a traditional linear relationship with Yit, butX2it does not have to.
The function s() is an unspecified smooth (non-parametric) function, often constructed
from a number of basis functions (e.g. splines). While the method was introduced
decades ago, GAMs have only recently gained popularity in application due to advances
in computing power, as estimation can become computationally intensive under high
dimensional settings. I recast the baseline regression model (Equation 6) in a GAM
setting specifically tailored to address the question at hand:
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∆Rit = αi + φ1∆Ri,t−1 + φ2∆yit + φ3∆πit + φ4∆RERit
+ φ5∆V IXt + φ6∆R̄t
+ γUS[ẐUS,t × s(Ŵ
$
it)×Kit] + γEU [ẐEU,t × s(Ŵ
e
it )×Kit] + ǫit. (9)
Notice in Equation 9, I leave everything as is, but now allow the the functional
relationship with peg intensity, Ŵ bit to be non-linear. Moreover, this specification allows
us to jointly investigate spillovers from the U.S. and E.U. because the model is able to
incorporate information from the full panel, hence no sub-sampling is required. The
smooth function s(Ŵ bit) is estimated via penalized cubic splines.
30 Two main estimation
approaches are typically used for fitting GAMs, cross validation or generalized cross
validation (GCV) or (restricted) maximum likelihood (REML). GCV is shown to be
unbiased asymptotically, but in application with small samples, typically suffers from
under-smoothing. For these reasons, I estimate the GAM via REML, which is typically
robust to under-smoothing but more computationally intensive (Wood [2017]).
There are alternative modeling approaches to GAMs which also allow for smooth
non-linear relationships in regression analysis. For instance, smooth transition models
have been used prominently for modeling exchange rate dynamics (Franses et al. [2000],
Taylor et al. [2001]). GAMs, however, are substantially different from smooth transition
models. First, GAMs are not restricted to discrete regimes, while smooth transition
models a priori assume discrete, usually two, regimes, while the transition between the
regimes is smooth.31 Moreover, the smooth transition between regimes typically has a
pre-specified functional form (e.g. logistic or exponential), which itself imposes symmetry
in the transition probabilities. Other potential issues with smooth transition models are
that identifying the transition function may be difficult in cases where the underlying data
does not provide sufficient information, and that findings can also depend on the starting
values. GAMs are not restricted by any of these parametric assumptions. Finally, and
crucially, GAMs are sufficiently flexible to allow for a single non-linearity in the model
within an interaction term. By only allowing spillovers to vary non-linearly with exchange
rate regime while keeping everything else similar to the standard econometric specification
(Equation 3), we can call out the marginal effects of introducing non-linearity along the
single, focal dimension tailored to our specific research question.
I estimate the model for all countries, and the two sub-samples (advanced economies
and emerging markets). For each model, the estimation procedure selected 10 knots.
Figure 5 shows U.S. spillover estimates under the GAM specification, with 95% credible
30Penalized cubic splines are cubic splines, but changes at knots are penalized, shrunk towards zero.
This helps prevent over fitting even in the presence of many knots.
31More than two regimes quickly increases the number of parameters that need to be estimated.
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intervals. Red dashed lines are the spillover estimates implied by the linear baseline
specification, Equation 6. It’s clear that for some regions of peg intensity, the non-
linearity is statistically significant at the 5% level or lower across both the full sample
and sub-samples.
Figure 5: GAM Estimates: U.S. spillover estimates by Peg Inten-
sity
Spillover estimate is under free capital controls (Kit = 1). Estimates are
from Equation 9. Shaded areas are 95% credible intervals. Number of knots
selected: 10 via REML. Red dashed line is the implied linear spillover under
Equation 6.
Across the full sample, the Trilemma effects don’t appear to kick in until peg intensity
reaches north of 0.50, suggesting that reasonably managed exchange rates can potentially
enjoy a high degree of monetary independence. However, the Trilemma conditions appear
to take effect sharply beyond a peg intensity of 0.75, accelerating rapidly. The monetary
transmission function is estimated to be highly non-linear for emerging markets, making
a wave-like pattern, only turning statistically significant for pegs and near-pegs. For peg
intensities ranging from 0 to 0.75, monetary policy spillover estimates are statistically
indifferent from zero for emerging markets. The advanced economy sub-sample also
indicates non-linear monetary spillovers, with statistically insignificant estimates from a
peg intensity of 0 to 0.5, but then spillover estimates accelerate sharply as peg intensity
rises further.
Binned analysis results for E.U. spillovers are reported in Table A.4, with GAM esti-
mates for E.U. spillovers are reported in Figure A.5. Unlike U.S. spillovers, E.U. spillovers
do not increase monotonically across bins (but do roughly increase in peg intensity), ex-
hibiting some non-linearity. However, under the GAM specification, these non-linearities
related to E.U. spillovers are statistically insignificant. Finally, for robustness, I also
present a set of results from the GAM estimation under a more conservative selection of
5 knots rather than the 10 knots selected by the estimation algorithm (Figure A.6), which
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increases the smoothness of the spillover function. The results and non-linear shapes pre-
sented here broadly hold, suggesting that the estimates are robust under varying tuning
parameters.
7.6 Discussion
The evidence from this section points to a non-linear trade-off between exchange rate
flexibility and monetary autonomy across the full sample and advanced economy and
emerging market sub samples, bringing into question the traditional assumption of a lin-
ear Trilemma. Initially, under the simple binned analysis, evidence pointed to non-linear
Trilemma trade-offs between monetary autonomy and exchange rate stability in both
advanced and emerging countries. Weak and moderate pegs come with more stability
than floating exchange rates while providing just as much monetary independence. Even
moving from a hard peg to one that is strongly managed appears to reduce dispropor-
tionately the degree of monetary policy pass-through a country is exposed to. These
non-linear patterns are further confirmed under the more sophisticated GAM model, and
the non-linearities test as statistically significant among both advanced economies and
emerging markets.
It’s also apparent that under varying degrees of peg intensity, countries allocate to do-
mestic targets differently, and this may be enabled by gains from a non-linear trade-off, or
weak adherence to the Trilemma. Among advanced economies, greater monetary auton-
omy bought with exchange rate flexibility is associated with stronger weights on domestic
policy objectives (output growth), with no evidence of a global financial cycle effect on
monetary policy. For emerging markets, exchange rate flexibility and greater monetary
autonomy translates to heavier emphasis on inflation as a domestic policy target. Global
financial cycle effects on monetary policy are present under both floating/near-floating
and near-hard/hard peg regimes in emerging markets, therefore mid-intensity pegs appear
to offer the best trade-off for this group of economies in terms of monetary independence
and exchange rate stability.
8 What Induces Non-Linear Monetary Spillovers?
8.1 Active reserves management
Is this empirical non-linearity between exchange rate flexibility and monetary autonomy
a free lunch, or generated through some economic friction? To address this, I explore two
possible mechanisms which could result in a non-linear trade off between exchange rate
stability and monetary independence. The first of these is the role of reserves accumu-
lation as an additional policy tool. The potential for foreign exchange interventions to
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allow a country to violate the Trilemma constraint has been discussed in the literature.
Obstfeld et al. [2010] argue that the demand for reserves is crucially motivated by the
objective of financial stability amid increased financial integration. Empirically, they find
that countries under soft pegs tend to hold significantly greater levels of reserves.32 These
countries may wish to actively intervene in exchange markets to prevent external financial
shocks from causing large exchange rate devaluations. Aizenman et al. [2010] document
the trend of several emerging markets choosing to target intermediate levels of exchange
rate stability and financial openness while maintaining high levels of monetary auton-
omy, thereby violating the Trilemma. These countries also tend to hold sizable levels of
international reserves. Steiner [2017] and Angrick [2018] also report evidence suggesting
that the policy Trilemma constraint can be relaxed with active reserves management.
Using international reserves to relax the policy Trilemma constraints applies whether
UIP holds or is violated. If UIP holds, a country may choose to intervene in foreign ex-
change markets as an alternative way to stabilize the exchange rate rather than altering
the interest rate directly. Specifically, sterilized interventions would, in theory, achieve
exchange rate stability without changing the money supply. On the other hand, unsteril-
ized interventions would alter the money supply, but with a lag, and therefore unsterilized
interventions can also grant exchange rate stability with monetary independence – in the
short-run. If UIP fails to hold (as it seems to empirically) then that itself causes the
Trilemma constraints to break down. In this situation, matching the monetary policy of
the base country may simply not be sufficient to maintain the desired level of exchange
rate stability, with direct intervention being more effective.
To investigate the role of active reserves management, I test whether the accumulating
and expending of country i’s foreign exchange reserves are associated with base country
monetary policy changes. To do this, I simply replace the dependent variable of the
baseline equation (Equation 6) with a measure of changes in international reserves:
∆IRit = αi + φ1∆IRi,t−1 + φ2∆yit + φ3∆πit + φ4∆RERit
+ φ5∆V IXt + φ6∆R̄t
+ γUS[ẐUS,t × Ŵ
$
it ×Kit] + γEU [ẐEU,t × Ŵ
e
it ×Kit] + ǫit, (10)
where ∆IRit is the quarterly change in logged international reserves (excluding gold)
of country i in quarter t. Reserves are measured in terms of USD. Considering the growth
of reserves accounts for differences in levels of international reserves across countries, and
the RHS of the equation controls for different GDP growth rates across countries – hence
this specification nests the case where reserves are measured per GDP, logged IR/GDP.
32The effect of a hard peg was found not to be statistically significant, but economically significant
and quantitatively similar to that under a soft peg.
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Data on international reserves is taken from the IMF International Reserves and Foreign
Currency Liquidity database.
A negative coefficient on γ̂b suggests that a reduction in reserves is associated with a
positive shock to the foreign interest rate, and this reduction strengthens in the degree
of exchange rate rigidity. Under a rigid exchange rate regime, a higher foreign interest
rate, without a reciprocated change in the local country interest rate, would cause capital
outflows and currency depreciation. However, this could be mitigated without an interest
rate change (i.e. preserving monetary independence) if the central bank steps in by selling
reserves to maintain exchange rate stability.
Table 8: International Reserves and Monetary Spillovers
Dep. Variable All Advanced Emerging
∆IRit Countries Economies Markets
γ̂US -2.00** -0.787 -3.296***
(0.815) (1.445) (1.033)
γ̂EU 1.400 0.456 1.923





it ∈ (0, 1) -2.079** -1.434 -4.117***
( 0.958) (1.344) (1.303)
γ̂EU , Ŵ
EU
it ∈ (0, 1) -1.344 -3.001 0.949
(5.065) (7.268) (4.162)
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the Country level. Estimation period: Q2
2000 - Q4 2018. Peg intensity used: Ŵ b
it
(RA, 2).
Table 8 reports coefficient estimates. The first two rows consider the full spectrum of
exchange rate flexibility including pure float and pure pegs (1,926 full sample observa-
tions) while the second two rows are considering only intermediate exchange rate regimes
(Ŵ bit ∈ (0, 1)) (1,330 full sample observations) to assure that the results aren’t driven by
corner policies. Reserves seem to be more sensitive to U.S. shocks than E.U. shocks, with
the latter not statistically significant across sub-samples. This is consistent, and may be
associated with the role of the U.S. Dollar making up a majority of reserve assets and
exchange rate pegs. The significant negative coefficients on U.S. monetary shocks sug-
gest that countries tend to reduce international reserves in response to a U.S. tightening,
possibly to stabilize the exchange rate and prevent excessive depreciation. This effect
strengthens in peg intensity, and is particularly significant among emerging markets,
consistent with previous studies. The effects become more pronounced when considering
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the sub-sample of intermediate exchange rate regimes, with E.U. shocks turning negative
and economically significant (but not statistically significant) for advanced economies.
For emerging markets under intermediate pegs to the U.S. Dollar, a coefficient of -4.12
implies that under a strongly managed peg (peg intensity of 0.80), a 1 percentage point
U.S. interest rate shock is associated with a reduction of international reserves equal to
[+1% x -4.12 x 0.80] = -3.2%.
The significant response of international reserves to monetary shocks in emerging
markets, which is particularly strong under intermediate exchange rate regimes, provides
some evidence supporting their role in relaxing the policy Trilemma, thereby enabling a
non-linear trade off between exchange rate stability and monetary autonomy.
8.2 Limits to international arbitrage
A second mechanism that may produce a non-linear trade off between monetary autonomy
and exchange rate stability is if there exists costly frictions which inhibit the free flow of
capital (e.g. transaction costs, intermediation fees, illiquidity), thereby violating the UIP
condition (Fama [1984], Engel [1996], Bansal and Dahlquist [2000]). In the presence of
such frictions, interest rate differentials between two pegged countries can persist, only
to be arbitraged when the differential widens enough to compensate the investor for the
associated costs. This suggests that monetary policy spillovers should not just be an
increasing function in a) financial openness and b) exchange rate rigidity, but also the c)
interest rate differential between the base country and country i. In other words, when the
interest rate differential is small, country i has more monetary autonomy, therefore the
pass-through of a U.S. monetary policy shock should be smaller, than when the interest
rate differential is large (all else fixed).
I test for evidence consistent with this hypothesis with a simple extension to the
baseline regression (Equation 6):
∆rit = αi + φ1∆ri,t−1 + φ2∆yit + φ3∆πit + φ4∆RERit







where the monetary policy shock instrument [ẐUS,t × Ŵ
b
it ×Kit] is further interacted
with the absolute lagged interest rate differential, |ri,t−1−rb,t−1|. Under this specification,
a positive estimate on γ̂b implies that for a given degree of exchange rate flexibility and
financial openness, monetary policy spillovers will be larger when interest rate differentials
are wider.
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Table 9: International Arbitrage and Monetary Spillovers
Dep. Variable All Advanced Emerging
∆rit Countries Economies Markets
γ̂US 0.042*** 0.182 0.0419***
(0.006) (0.161) (0.007)
γ̂EU 0.004 0.317** -0.047





it ∈ (0, 1) 0.013 0.208 -0.007
( 0.029) (0.164) (0.026)
γ̂EU , Ŵ
EU
it ∈ (0, 1) 0.150** 0.291** 0.108
(0.070) (0.130) (0.084)
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the Country level. Estimation period: Q2
2000 - Q4 2018. Peg intensity used: Ŵ b
it
(RA, 2).
Table 9 reports estimates of γ̂b, testing whether the interest rate differential influ-
ences monetary policy transmission. While broadly, coefficient estimates are positive
(consistent with limits to arbitrage), statistical significance varies. The strongest evi-
dence supporting limits to arbitrage is present in advanced economies targeting the Euro
(estimate of 0.317), and this effect is robust for the sub-sample of intermediate pegs (esti-
mate of 0.291). A significant effect of interest rate differentials on monetary pass through
is also seen in emerging markets targeting the USD, however, this effect is driven by
corner policies (namely emerging markets under fixed or floating exchange rate regimes).
For advanced economies targeting the Euro, the limits to arbitrage mechanism shows
the strongest evidence of driving a non-linear exchange rate regime-monetary autonomy
trade-off. Overall however, evidence of a limits to arbitrage friction is weaker than the
evidence supporting the role of active reserves management. The use of international re-
serves, specifically among emerging markets, may be an important factor allowing coun-
tries to ‘lean against’ the Trilemma constraint, corroborating Aizenman et al. [2010].
Thus, active use of international reserves results in what appears to be exchange rate
stability, without necessarily losing monetary autonomy.
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9 Robustness
9.1 Long-Run Monetary Policy Adjustment
The main analysis focuses on short-run associations between country i and the base
country’s monetary policy, while Shambaugh [2004] highlight the possibility of long-run
adjustment in the policy rate which might also depend on the Trilemma configuration.
That is, even if policy rates across countries respond immediately to one another, it’s
also possible for country i’s interest rate to be increasingly cointegrated with the base
country’s interest rate as peg intensity rises, so interest rate adjustment occurs over both
the short-run and over a longer period of time.33 To test for this, I extend Equation 6
to include two error-correcting terms: a cointegrating vector between country i’s interest
rate and the base country (U.S. and E.U. interest rates, respectively), interacted with
peg intensity and capital openness:
(ri,t−1 − Cbrb,t−1)× Ŵ
b
i,t−1 ×Ki,t−1. (12)
Typically one estimates Cb in a first-stage, but I pre-set Cb = 1, effectively defining the
cointegrating vector as the interest rate differential between country i and base country
b.34 A negative coefficient on this term implies that when country i’s interest rate exceeds
the base country’s, it will induce adjustment in the policy rate to catch down to the base
country’s. The interaction with peg intensity allows the rate of reversion to strengthen
with peg intensity as expected under the policy Trilemma. The interaction with capital
openness allows for comparison across countries with identical openness yet differing peg
intensities.
Table 10 reports long-run spillover effects.35 Short run estimates are included to
verify that they are not sensitive to the inclusion of error-correction terms. Across the
sample, there is evidence of longer-run adjustment in country i’s interest rate to both
base countries E.U. and U.S. which increases in country i’s peg intensity to either base
country. The negative coefficient sign is theoretically consistent: when the interest rate
differential is positive (negative), country i’s policy rate adjusts in the direction of the base
country interest rate. When stratifying the sample into advanced and emerging market
sub-samples, it’s the emerging markets which exhibit evidence of statistically significant
error-correction in their policy rates under both U.S. and E.U. pegs, while advanced
economies generally only exhibit evidence of strong short-run monetary spillovers. If the
33This could be due to various financial market imperfections or practical limits to arbitrage.
34Constraining the cointegrating vector to the interest rate differential by setting Cb = 1 is theoretically
consistent with UIP.
35Robust standard errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification of Equation 6 plus




Table 10: Short vs. Long-run Monetary Spillovers
Dep. Variable All Advanced Emerging
∆rit Countries Economies Markets
γ̂US 0.398*** 0.783*** 0.283**
(0.116) (0.199) (0.112)
γ̂EU 0.419*** 0.684*** 0.206
(0.142) (0.120) ( 0.239)
(ri,t−1 − rUS,t−1)× Ŵ
US
i,t−1 ×Ki,t−1 -0.022** -0.035 -0.023**
( 0.011) (0.025) (0.011)
(ri,t−1 − rEU,t−1)× Ŵ
EU
i,t−1 ×Ki,t−1 -0.075*** 0.001 -0.084***
(0.022) (0.031) (0.024)
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the Country level. Estimation period: Q2
2000 - Q4 2018. Peg intensity used: Ŵ b
it
(RA, 2).
sample is limited to only intermediate pegs (Ŵ bit ∈ (0, 1)), the long-run effect against E.U.
peg intensity turns significant at the 1% level while the long-run effect vis-a-vis the U.S.
turns insignificant,36 precisely matching patterns in short-run effects for emerging markets
under intermediate pegs, thereby supportive of potentially non-linear policy trade-offs
between exchange rate stability and monetary autonomy.
Given the high rate of short-run pass-through among advanced economies, it is plausi-
ble that base country monetary policy spillovers occur rather quickly and to their full ex-
tent among these countries. The significant long-run adjustment among emerging markets
at least in part, may explain their relatively weak and imperfect short run pass-through,
suggesting that across emerging markets the monetary spillover from base countries may
take longer. These results are consistent with the fact that emerging markets are consid-
erably less finanially developed and host to generally weaker institutions – both factors
potentially inducing greater financial market frictions compared to their advanced econ-
omy counterparts.
9.2 Alternative Measures of Exchange Rate Flexibility
As a robustness check, I also consider the fine exchange rate regime classifications of
Ilzetzki et al. [2019] (IRR). For this exercise, I only consider U.S. shocks rather than both
U.S. and E.U. shocks since the construction of the IRR data doesn’t consider de facto
basket anchors. The IRR exchange rate regime data, which are monthly, are aggregated
to quarterly averages. There are five levels: Floating, Weak Managed Float, Moderate
Managed Float, Strong Managed Float, and Fixed (U.S. is the anchor currency). Denote
36This result is not reported in Table 10.
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them: 1, 2, 3 and 4 and 5, respectively. The original IRR fine classification contains 15
different regimes. I consolidate levels 2 through 13 into the respective bins described in
Table 11. Using this alternative exchange rate regime classification, I test for evidence of
non-linear monetary policy transmission (with respect to the exchange rate regime).




11, 12 2 (Weak Managed)
9, 10 3 (Moderate Managed)
6, 7, 8 4 (Strong Managed)
2, 3, 4, 5 5 (Peg)
IRR level 1, 14 and 15 are omitted. They correspond to, re-
spectively: 1: no legal tender, 14: collapsing currency, 15: dual
market with missing data.
The regression specification used is the same as Equation 6, but with only U.S. shocks,
and now the discrete IRR exchange rate regimes:
∆Rit = αi + φ1∆Ri,t−1 + φ2∆yit + φ3∆πit + φ4∆RERit
+ φ5∆V IXt + φ6∆R̄t
+ γUS(IRR)[ẐUS,t ×D(IRR)
$
it ×Kit] + ǫit. (13)
The coefficient γ̂US(IRR) represents the spillover coefficients across the five different
IRR exchange rate regime classifications. If the estimates are not significantly and/or
monotonically increasing in exchange rate rigidity, the story of non-linear monetary
spillovers remains consistent with the primary analysis.
Table A.5 reports estimates of γ̂US(IRR) across all countries, advanced economies,
and emerging markets. The general pattern persists: under more rigid exchange rates
(3, 4 and 5), there is disproportionately less monetary independence. The hard peg
(bin 5) estimates, interestingly, are statistically insignificant for emerging markets, but
highly rigid floats (bin 4) are indeed significant and subject to high monetary pass-
through (estimate of 0.862). Across all three groups of countries, pass-through under free
floating regimes less than 0.20 (but statistically significant among advanced economies),
suggesting considerable monetary independence from the U.S. under a floating exchange
rate.
To summarize, under a different measure of exchange rate regime, the results of mon-
etary pass-through tend to be consistent with the baseline analysis. In addition, the
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robustness check confirms suggestive non-linearities in most cases, where different de-
grees of flexibility within intermediate exchange rate regimes indicate disproportionate
gains/losses in monetary autonomy.
9.3 Accounting for the Zero Lower Bound
As mentioned in Section 5, both the U.S. and the E.U. saw prolonged episodes where
the policy rate was pinned to the effective lower bound. The baseline specification treats
these episodes as having little to no variation in monetary policy. Despite this, the
use of unconventional policy tools were widespread in both countries, and therefore,
it’s important to allow for variation in monetary conditions which may not be directly
observable through the policy rate. To do this, I take U.S. and E.U. shadow policy rates
(Wu and Xia [2016]), which replace actual policy rates pinned to the ZLB with model-
implied shadow rates. After the global financial crisis, while observed policy rates were
at near-zero, unprecedented levels of monetary easing drove shadow rates into negative
territory.
The approach is simple, I replace actual policy rates Rbt with the shadow rate value,
if Rbt is at the effective lower bound.
37 Then, I recompute the residual monetary shock
Ẑbt from the series of ∆Rbt spliced with shadow rates. The results after augmenting
policy shocks with shadow rates are reported in Table A.6, and are largely consistent
with the baseline analysis. In the full sample, significant evidence of the spillovers under
the Trilemma continues to be present, and monetary policy pass-through strengthens
among the advanced economy sub-sample. For emerging markets, there is no evidence of
spillovers under a EUR target, but there is significant, albeit weaker evidence of spillovers
under a USD target. These results mirror those found under the baseline analysis.
9.4 Unanticipated U.S. Monetary Policy Shocks
It’s very possible that residual changes in interest rates ẐUS,t and ẐEU,t, used as interest
rate ‘shocks’ are still containing endogenous movements related to omitted or unobserved
expectations and macroeconomic forces. As an additional robustness check, I replace
ẐUS,t with identified U.S. monetary policy shocks, exploiting the movement in Fed Fund
futures contracts around FOMC announcements (Kuttner [2001]).38 The slight alteration
to the baseline regression then yields the following specification:
37This is precisely how the shadow rate is defined.
38Bluedorn and Bowdler [2010] replace changes to U.S. interest rates with these ‘Fed Funds shocks’
to test the Trilemma, reporting highly significant results and near complete monetary pass-through to
pegged countries.
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∆Rit = αi + φ1∆Ri,t−1 + φ2∆yit + φ3∆πit + φ4∆RERit
+ φ5∆V IXt + φ6∆R̄t
+ γUS[FFSUS,t × Ŵ
$
it ×Kit] + γEU [ẐEU,t × Ŵ
e
it ×Kit] + ǫit. (14)
Notice that the only alteration is that U.S. interest rate residuals ẐUS,t are replaced
with Fed Fund shocks FFSUS,t. These shocks are computed by taking the change in
the front-month Fed Funds futures contract over the day of a scheduled FOMC meeting.
Then, these daily changes are aggregated to the quarterly frequency.39
Table A.7 reports the baseline spillover estimates, but now with Fed Funds shocks
replacing the U.S. interest rate residual. Consistent with Bluedorn and Bowdler [2010],
estimates across the full sample, advanced economies, and emerging markets all suggest
γ̂US = 1 within 95% confidence bands, suggesting approximate 1-for-1 U.S. interest rate
pass-through under open capital flows and a fixed exchange rate. The full country sample
and advanced economy sub-sample estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level
(estimates of 0.944 and 1.049, respectively), while the emerging market estimate of γ̂US
using FFSUS,t is statistically significant at the 11% level (estimate of 0.867). Overall
estimates of monetary pass-through under continuous exchange rate regime measures are
robust to using either actual or unanticipated changes in U.S. monetary policy.
9.5 Omitting 2008-2010 Global Financial Crisis
I omit Q1 2008 - Q4 2010 and re-estimate the baseline regression (Equation 6) to infer
to what degree the 2008 Global Financial Crisis may be driving estimates of monetary
pass-through. It’s the conventional view that over this period, global factors were driving
synchronized fluctuations in real activity and financial volatility across countries. There-
fore it may be possible that correlations between monetary policy of different countries
were actually responding to domestic conditions which happened to be synchronized.
Table A.8 reports the results of the baseline tests (Equation 6) after omitting the
crisis period, Q1 2008 - Q4 2010. Across all countries, advanced economies, and emerging
markets, the pass-through effects remain robust to omitting the crisis period. In fact, the
pass-through effects on both U.S. and E.U. coefficients rise in the ‘all country’ sample after
omitting the crisis period (to 0.522 and 0.398, respectively). Across advanced countries,
spillover estimates remain stable and highly significant. The pass-through coefficient
for emerging markets rises considerably (to 0.474) after omitting the crisis period. The
evidence of intermediate exchange rate regimes affecting the pass-through of monetary
39There is no severe serial correlation generated through aggregation. Unit root tests on the quarterly
FF shock series reject the null of a unit root.
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policy remains a highly robust feature of the data, insensitive to the Global Financial
Crisis.
9.6 Time-varying SDR Basket Weights
Effective October 2016, the IMF added the Chinese Yuan as an additional currency in the
SDR basket. As of that date, the currencies and corresponding weights were U.S. dollar
41.73%, euro 30.93%, renminbi (Chinese yuan) 10.92%, Japanese yen 8.33%, British
pound 8.09%. Due to the time-varying nature of SDR component weights, it’s possible
that our peg intensity measures, and spillover estimates are sensitive to abrupt changes
in SDR composition. As a simple check to assess whether the overall results are sensitive
to SDR rebalancing, I estimate the baseline regressions over the pre-2016 sample period,
before the Yuan was introduced as an SDR component. Results are reported in Table
A.9. Overall, the results from the pre-Yuan estimation very closely match the baseline
results estimated over the entire sample period.
9.7 Including lower-dimension interaction terms
Our baseline equations for testing monetary policy spillovers include the interaction
Ẑb,t × Ŵ
b
it × Kit but no lower-dimension interactions of these covariates nor do they
enter individually. It may be of interest to see if any additional insight may be provided
under the specification which includes all lower-dimension terms:
∆Rit = αi + φ1∆Ri,t−1 + φ2∆yit + φ3∆πit + φ4∆RERit




















it ×Kit] + ǫit. (15)
Under this expanded specification, the impact of a 100 basis point country b monetary
policy shock (Ẑb,t) on country i’s policy rate would be equal to
γ1b + γ4bŴ
b
it + γ5bKit + γ7b[Ŵ
b
it ×Kit]. (16)
For instance, a country with a fixed exchange rate and open capital account would have
a spillover coefficient of γ1b + γ4b + γ5b + γ7b. While there is a structural interpretation
of the instrument Ẑb,t × Ŵ
b
it × Kit, it does not necessarily follow that including the
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lower-dimension terms is theoretically appropriate. Therefore this exercise is mainly
exploratory.
Table A.10 reports the estimates for all coefficients linked to U.S. and E.U. mone-
tary policy shocks (γ̂1b, γ̂4b, γ̂5b, γ̂7b). Interestingly, the flat marginal effect of a U.S.
monetary policy shock given by γ̂1,US is negative for all three sub-samples (all countries,
advanced economies, emerging markets). Consistent with the Trilemma conditions, U.S.
monetary spillovers are increasing in peg intensity (γ̂4,US) and capital account openness
(γ̂5,US) while the estimate on the three-way interaction, Ẑb,t× Ŵ
b
it×Kit, given by γ̂7,US is
statistically insignificant across all three sub-samples, with a positive estimate for the ad-
vanced economy sub-sample and a negative estimate on the emerging market sub-sample.
As with the baseline results, the effects of E.U. monetary spillovers are not statistically
significant in this extended specification.
10 Concluding Remarks
In this study, I investigate monetary policy spillovers under the Trilemma with a partic-
ular focus on intermediate exchange rates. Specifically, I test empirically the shape of
the Trilemma, which often assumes a linear trade-off between exchange rate stability and
monetary autonomy. To address this issue, I propose a continuous de facto measure of
exchange rate regime which considers the entire spectrum of exchange rate flexibility. I
test and find significant evidence of a non-linear Trilemma, such that gains in exchange
rate stability may not come with a proportionate loss in monetary autonomy along some
parts of the peg intensity spectrum. Moreover, I show some evidence suggesting that
for emerging markets, active reserves management may be generating these empirical
non-linearities. Gains in monetary autonomy from this non-linear trade off are allocated
differently across advanced economies and emerging markets. Advanced economies tend
to put greater emphasis on output stabilization while emerging markets focus on infla-
tion. However, emerging market monetary policy also becomes increasingly vulnerable
global financial shocks as they move towards more flexible exchange rates. I also draw
implications for monetary policy spillovers under basket pegs, showing that targeting
multiple exchange rates may help diversify against foreign interest rate shocks.
The fact that the Two-Corners hypothesis has been continuously rejected, combined
with the scarcity of pure floats, suggests that the de facto dominance of intermediate ex-
change rate regimes is here to stay. This paper’s findings, specifically those suggesting a
non-linear Trilemma trade-off concerning monetary independence, may provide one pos-
sible explanation as to why the majority of countries consistently choose middle-ground
exchange rate policies. To bolster this argument, future research includes developing a
simple model which investigates under what conditions some exchange rate stabilization
may be optimal in minimizing a central bank’s loss function based on domestic targets.
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The solution will depend on both the sensitivity of domestic economic activity to real
exchange rate fluctuations and to domestic policy rate changes, both of which depend on
the pass-through of foreign monetary policy.
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Figure A.1: Distribution of R2 for Quarterly regressions where
peg intensity estimates equal 1
Density plot for R2 statistics across all country-quarters which
have Ŵ b
it
= 1 for one b (fixed exchange rate regimes). Estimated
from Equation 1.
A1
Figure A.2: Change in Peg Intensity from 2000 to 2018 by cur-
rency
Peg intensities estimated from Equation 1, top panel reports
change in intensity from 2000 to 2018 with respect to USD peg
intensity. Bottom panel reports change in intensity from 2000 to
2018 with respect to EUR intensity.
A2
Figure A.3: Peg intensities over time, selected countries
Peg intensities estimated from Equation 1, with triangle (solid)
points denoting peg intensity with respect to the EUR and upside-
down triangle (clear) points denoting peg intensity with respect
to the USD.
A3
Figure A.4: Peg intensities over time, cross-country average
Each period point refers to the cross-country average of peg inten-
sities. Peg intensities estimated from Equation 1, with triangle
(solid) points denoting peg intensity with respect to the EUR
and upside-down triangle (clear) points denoting peg intensity
with respect to the USD.
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Figure A.5: GAM Estimates: E.U. spillover estimates by Peg
Intensity
Spillover estimate is under free capital controls (Kit = 1). Es-
timates are from Equation 9. Shaded areas are 95% credible
intervals. Number of knots selected: 10 via REML. Red dashed
line is the implied linear spillover under Equation 6.
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Figure A.6: GAM Estimates: E.U. spillover estimates by Peg
Intensity, with knot number set to 5
Spillover estimate is under free capital controls (Kit = 1). Es-
timates are from Equation 9. Shaded areas are 95% credible
intervals. Number of knots selected: 5. Red dashed line is the
implied linear spillover under Equation 6.
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Table A.1: Country Summary
Country T Type
1 Albania 75 EME
2 Argentina 62 EME
3 Australia 75 AE
4 Bahrain 75 EME
5 Brazil 73 EME
6 Bulgaria 75 EME
7 Canada 75 AE
8 Chile 74 EME
9 China 75 EME
10 Colombia 75 EME
11 Croatia 70 EME
12 Czech.Republic 75 EME
13 Denmark 75 AE
14 Hong Kong 75 AE
15 Hungary 75 EME
16 Iceland 74 AE
17 India 75 EME
18 Indonesia 75 EME
19 Israel 75 EME
20 Japan 75 AE
21 Kazakhstan 75 EME
22 Macedonia 72 EME
23 Malaysia 75 EME
24 Mauritius 75 EME
25 Mexico 74 EME
26 Nepal 75 EME
27 New Zealand 75 AE
28 Norway 75 AE
29 Peru 74 EME
30 Philippines 75 EME
31 Poland 75 EME
32 Qatar 75 EME
33 Romania 71 EME
34 Russia 74 EME
35 Saudi Arabia 75 EME
36 Serbia 72 EME
37 Singapore 75 AE
38 South Africa 75 EME
39 South Korea 75 EME
40 Sweden 75 AE
41 Switzerland 75 AE
42 Thailand 75 EME
43 Trinidad and Tobago 74 EME
44 Turkey 66 EME
45 United Kingdom 75 AE
46 Uruguay 65 EME
Summary of countries in the main panel. Type denotes Advanced (AE) or
Emerging Market Economy (EME), respectively. Column T refers to country




















# Country/FX USD (2000) USD (2018) EUR (2000) EUR (2018) JPY (2000) JPY (2018)
1 AED 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 ALL 0.30 0.75 0.09 0.84 0.00 0.08
3 ARS 0.96 0.50 0.03 0.58 0.02 0.16
4 AUD 0.22 0.09 0.30 0.65 0.22 0.05
5 BGN 0.04 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.00
6 BHD 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 BND 0.74 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.07
8 BRL 0.99 0.25 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.51
9 CAD 0.69 0.17 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.00
10 CHF 0.13 0.07 0.88 0.52 0.03 0.24
11 CLP 0.68 0.42 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.12
12 CNY 1.00 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 COP 0.50 0.30 0.00 0.21 0.09 0.18
14 CZK 0.08 0.00 0.76 0.79 0.04 0.00
15 DKK 0.01 0.00 0.99 0.98 0.00 0.00
16 DZD 0.27 0.45 0.63 0.27 0.06 0.00
17 GBP 0.09 0.00 0.15 0.07 0.00 0.01
18 HKD 0.96 0.93 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.00
19 HRK 0.00 0.01 0.98 0.98 0.02 0.00
20 HUF 0.06 0.00 0.99 0.90 0.00 0.01
21 IDR 0.50 0.29 0.24 0.30 0.32 0.00
22 ILS 0.95 0.37 0.06 0.42 0.04 0.08
23 INR 0.92 0.49 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.01
24 ISK 0.25 0.11 0.45 0.26 0.00 0.18









































































# Country/FX USD (2000) USD (2018) EUR (2000) EUR (2018) JPY (2000) JPY (2018)
26 KWD 0.85 0.82 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.02
27 LKR 0.87 0.74 0.09 0.01 0.04 0.06
28 MKD 0.39 0.25 0.15 0.05 0.01 0.08
29 MXN 0.98 0.27 0.14 0.53 0.09 0.23
30 MYR 0.93 0.48 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.01
31 NOK 0.30 0.00 0.74 0.47 0.09 0.01
32 NPR 0.99 0.82 0.06 0.41 0.01 0.18
33 NZD 0.32 0.16 0.31 0.62 0.09 0.10
34 OMR 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
35 PEN 0.95 0.68 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.02
36 PHP 0.83 0.95 0.20 0.32 0.12 0.05
37 PKR 0.87 0.96 0.00 0.24 0.09 0.11
38 PLN 0.34 0.00 0.33 0.94 0.00 0.03
39 QAR 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
40 RON 1.00 0.04 0.11 0.95 0.03 0.03
41 RSD 0.47 0.00 0.14 0.33 0.14 0.13
42 RUB 0.99 0.43 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.00
43 SAR 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
44 SEK 0.20 0.00 0.68 0.44 0.04 0.08
45 SGD 0.73 0.14 0.06 0.17 0.08 0.04
46 THB 0.76 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.02
47 TRY 0.59 0.67 0.44 0.60 0.07 0.00
48 TTD 0.96 0.88 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02
49 TWD 0.92 0.32 0.10 0.04 0.06 0.06
50 UAH 0.96 0.69 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.05
51 UYU 1.00 0.76 0.05 0.33 0.04 0.14





















































Table A.4: Spillover Effects across Peg Intensity Bins: Pooled
Model (Equation 6) with Exchange Rate Regime Dummies
Bin 1 2 3 4 5 6
ŴUSit (RA, 2) [0,0.1] (0.1,.30] (0.30,.50] (0.50,0.70] (0.70,0.90] (0.90,1]
All Countries
γ̂US -0.011 0.182 -0.046 0.022 0.127* 0.389***
(0.065) (0.160) (0.157) (0.213) (0.065) (0.141)
γ̂EU 0.285* 0.257 0.614*** 0.998** -0.060 0.418***
(0.156) (0.212) (0.235) (0.404) (0.248) (0.119)
Advanced Economies
γ̂US 0.080* 0.098 0.168*** 0.305*** 0.376*** 0.771***
(0.041) (0.104) (0.056) ( 0.066) (0.050) (0.211)
γ̂EU 0.444*** 0.303*** 0.399** 1.039*** 0.332*** 0.566***
(0.081) (0.066) (0.171) (0.199) (0.096) (0.085)
Emerging Markets
γ̂US -0.210 0.271 -0.198 -0.064 0.076 0.292**
( 0.159) (0.552) ( 0.348) ( 0.304) (0.073) (0.135)
γ̂EU 0.198 0.136 0.773** 0.309 -0.771 0.401**
( 0.209) (0.336) (0.386) (1.252) (0.701) (0.171)
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, re-
spectively. Robust standard errors clustered at the Country level.
Regression specification of Equation 6, using dummy variables for
values of ŴUS
it
(RA, 2). Estimation period Q2 2000 - Q4 2018.
Country Fixed Effects included.
.
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Table A.5: Spillover Effects across IRR (2019) Ilzetzki et al. [2019]
Exchange Rate Regimes: Pooled Model (Equation 13) with Ex-
change Rate Regime Dummies
Floating Fixed
IRR Classification 1 2 3 4 5
All Countries
γ̂US(IRR) 0.019 0.208*** -0.126 0.474*** 0.516**
(0.107) (0.069) (0.084) (0.162) (0.211)
Advanced Economies
γ̂US(IRR) 0.194*** 0.328*** 0.768*** 0.268*** 1.069***
(0.056) (0.047) (0.216) (0.075) (0.025)
Emerging Markets
γ̂US(IRR) -0.235 0.160 -0.213*** 0.862*** 0.282
(0.214) (0.102) (0.006) (0.276) (0.181)
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respec-
tively. Robust standard errors clustered at the Country level.
Estimation period Q2 2000 - Q4 2016. Country Fixed Effects
included.
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γ̂US 0.319*** 0.643*** 0.220**
(0.087) (0.116) (0.089)
γ̂EU 0.189*** 0.233*** 0.142
(0.067) (0.079) (0.110)
Adj. R2 0.14 0.39 0.13
F-Statistic 57.11 50.85 39.03
N×T 2,532 644 1,887
Country FE Y Y Y
Time FE N N N
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification
of Equation 6, with Rbt values for U.S. and E.U. at the ZLB imputed using
Wu and Xia [2016] shadow rates. Estimation period: Q2 2000 - Q4 2018. Peg
intensity estimate used is Ŵ b
it
(RA, 2). Within adjusted R-squared reported.




γ̂US 0.944** 1.049*** 0.867
(0.392) (0.281) (0.534)
γ̂EU 0.535*** 0.817*** 0.239
(0.128) (0.117) (0.168)
Adj. R2 0.13 0.33 0.13
F-Statistic 54.85 42.61 38.88
N×T 2,532 644 1,887
Country FE Y Y Y
Time FE N N N
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification
of Equation 14. Estimation period: Q2 2000 - Q4 2018. Peg intensity es-
timate used is Ŵ b
it
(RA, 2). FOMC monetary policy shocks are implied
yield changes from front month Fed Funds Futures contracts over the day of
an FOMC announcement. Changes are aggregated to quarterly frequency.
Within adjusted R-squared reported.
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γ̂US 0.522*** 0.616*** 0.474***
(0.127) (0.121) (0.166)
γ̂EU 0.398*** 0.575*** 0.183
(0.152) (0.102) (0.343)
Adj. R2 0.12 0.39 0.11
F-Statistic 42.88 44.78 28.91
N×T 2,120 539 1,580
Country FE Y Y Y
Time FE N N N
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification
of Equation 6. Estimation period: Q2 2000 - Q4 2018 but omitting crisis
window of Q1 2008 - Q4 2010. Peg intensity estimate used is Ŵ b
it
(RA, 2).
Within adjusted R-squared reported.




γ̂US 0.367*** 0.754*** 0.255**
(0.126) (0.217) (0.166)
γ̂EU 0.497*** 0.766*** 0.186
(0.135) (0.115) (0.343)
Adj. R2 0.13 0.46 0.14
F-Statistic 48.55 56.83 32.10
N×T 2,157 556 1,600
Country FE Y Y Y
Time FE N N N
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification
of Equation 6. Estimation period: Q2 2000 - Q4 2015, omitting period with
the Yuan entering the SDR Basket (as of 2016). Peg intensity estimate used
is Ŵ b
it
(RA, 2). Within adjusted R-squared reported.
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Table A.10: Including lower-dimension interaction terms (Equa-
tion 15)
(1) (2) (3)
All Countries Advanced Economies Emerging Markets
γ̂1,US -0.608** -0.535*** -0.534
(0.274) (0.118) (0.346)
γ̂4,US 0.592* 0.408 0.538
(0.315) (1.488) (0.382)
γ̂5,US 0.635** 0.562*** 0.407
(0.301) (0.120) (0.427)
γ̂7,US -0.293 0.213 -0.151
(0.398) (1.570) (0.475)
γ̂1,EU 0.127 -0.053 0.171
(0.203) ( 0.388) (0.210)
γ̂4,EU 0.209 -0.570 0.286
(0.395) (1.556) (0.475)
γ̂5,EU 0.162 0.460 -0.004
(0.278) (0.411) (0.327)
γ̂7,EU -0.119 0.825 -0.328
(0.504) (1.613) (0.691)
Adj. R2 0.15 0.46 0.133
F-Statistic 26.98 30.25 17.90
N×T 2,532 644 1,887
Country FE Y Y Y
Time FE N N N
***,**,* refer to significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Ro-
bust standard errors clustered at the Country level. Regression specification
of Equation 15. Estimation period: Q2 2000 - Q4 2018. For peg intensities
using 2-quarter rolling average, Ŵ b
it
(RA, 2). Estimated peg intensities are
from Equation 1. Within adjusted R-squared reported.
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